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I. INTRODUCTION
It is commonplace to observe that there are differences between
private 10b-5 actions and common-law actions for deceit,
notwithstanding that both travel under the name of "fraud."' It is
equally commonplace to suppose that these differences primarily reflect
the need to adapt law that was first developed in a world of face-to-face
transactions to the modern reality of large-scale, impersonal markets.
The poster children for the transition from common-law fraud to
securities fraud are, first, the Supreme Court's adoption in Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine2 and, second, the
related emergence of securities fraud class actions. 3
Amidst this conventional wisdom, one can identify two distinct

characterizations of the continuities and discontinuities between the
old law of deceit and the new law of fraud on the market. The first holds
roughly as follows. A. securities fraud suit that invokes the fraud-onthe-market theory-though statutory in origin, and though in some
ways an extension of common law-imposes liability on the same
substantive terms as the law of deceit. To be sure, federal law does not
incorporate every facet of common-law doctrine. 4 Still, at their core,
fraud-on-the-market claims track claims for deceit. On this view, the
divergences between deceit and fraud-on-the-market claims are
primarily procedural and evidentiary, rather than substantive.
The Supreme Court's 10b-5 jurisprudence seems to reflect this
understanding of fraud-on-the-market claims. The Court has, after all,
given close attention to the elements of deceit in defining the scope of
liability for fraud on the market. This approach dates back to Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, which read the common law's scienter requirement
into 10b-5 law.5 More recently, in DuraPharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Broudo,
the Court held that fraud-on-the-market plaintiffs must prove
"economic loss" and "loss causation," two requirements it claimed to find
in common-law deceit 6 Even in Basic, the Justices insisted that the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine did not eliminate the reliance element of

1.
To avoid ambiguities that attend use of the word "fraud," we will primarily refer to the
particular tort of fraud (sometimes called "intentional misrepresentation") by its older commonlaw name of "deceit."
2.
485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
3.
On the relation of Basic to the emergence of securities fraud class actions, see Donald C.
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 152.
4.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 162 (2008) (noting
that section 10(b) does not incorporate all aspects of common-law fraud).
5.
425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976).

6.

544 U.S. 336, 336 (2005).
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deceit but instead merely adopted a rebuttable presumption of
reliance.7
The Court's treatment of fraud on the market as akin to
common-law deceit is also evidenced indirectly by the Justices'
attention to the procedural aspects of securities litigation. Implicit in
this attention is an assumption that the major challenges they face in
defining the contours of fraud-on-the-market liability are procedural.
The trick has been to figure out how courts can manage securities fraud
litigation so that victims of deceit get appropriate relief without
allowing litigation to spin out of control. The recent Amgen decision
displays this'aspect of the Justices' mindset.8
In contrast to the view we have just attributed to the Court,
there is an alternative account-sometimes expressed by academics
critical of the Court's decisions-of the differences between fraud on the
market and common-law deceit.9 On this view, the Justices have erred
in supposing that the law of deceit sets the substantive terms of liability
for securities fraud. Deceit, and its core requirement of reliance, were
developed in a world of face-to-face transactions. It cannot be expected
to apply comfortably in today's world of institutional investors and
computerized trading. The Justices have been fooling themselves, or
engaging in their own kind of deceit, by insisting that they are applying
the traditional common law in establishing the contours of 10b-5
liability.
According to this view, modern securities law has departed
fundamentally from its private-law roots, and appropriately so. Fraudon-the-market claims are claims for a public or regulatory wrong, not a
traditional tort or private wrong. They allege that the defendant has
harmed a public resource-the market-by distorting prices.10
Securities fraud class actions, on this view, are primarily mechanisms

7.

485 U.S. at 243.

8.
133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013) (holding that the materiality of defendant's
misrepresentation need not be proven to permit class certification); see also Erica P. John Fund,
Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. ct. 2179, 2186 (2011) (stating that plaintiffs need not prove loss
causation to obtain class certification); cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007)
(holding that plaintiffs Sherman Act complaint cannot rely on a mere recitation of the elements
of a claim and must contain sufficient factual allegations). Obviously the Justices have disagreed
among themselves about how to strike this balance correctly.
9.
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after Halliburton, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 895 (2013); Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully:A Duty-Based

Approach to Reliance and Third-PartyLiability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 214041, 2144 (2010) (suggesting that the Court in Basic effectively implemented, without owning up to
doing so, an entitlement enjoyed by buyers and sellers of securities to trade at a nondistorted price
and that liability on this basis goes well beyond compensating victims for their losses).
10. Fisch, supra note 9.
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for the protection of markets rather than particular investors." Of
course, successful 10b-5 plaintiffs and their lawyers are entitled to
compensatory damages. But they earn that compensation largely as
private attorneys general whom society rewards for harnessing civil
litigation to achieve a desirable policy goal. The Court's efforts to make
them jump through common-law hoops in order to prevail have thus
been misguided, according to the critics. The requirements of scienter,
reliance, economic loss, and loss causation do not mesh with the goal of
ensuring that securities fraud class actions are available to protect the
integrity of markets.
Against the two views just outlined, we aim in this Article to
articulate an alternative view of how fraud-on-the-market claims relate
to the common law of deceit. We characterize our proposed "third way"
in terms of three main ideas.

First, consistent with the Court's view, we reject the notion that
deceit is a wrong that belongs to a bygone era of face-to-face
transactions. Deceit is quite obviously applicable to impersonal
interactions, as we point out in Part II. The gist of deceit is a defendant
intentionally misrepresenting a fact and thereby inducing the plaintiff
to act to his or her detriment. This is why, as we have argued previously,
reliance is an element of deceit.12 But the plaintiff and the defendant
need not be in a face-to-face transaction in order for the defendant to
dupe the plaintiff. Rather, the defendant deceives the plaintiff any time
the defendant knowingly utters a misrepresentation, intending for
persons such as the plaintiff to rely on it, and the plaintiff actually and
justifiably relies on the substance of the misrepresentation.
Although we defend the applicability of the tort of deceit to
impersonal transactions, we nonetheless agree with commentators who
argue that the fraud-on-the-market version of securities fraud is not
merely an application of the common law of deceit. This is our second
claim, developed in Parts III and IV. These Parts examine aspects of
the Court's reasoning in Dura and Basic, respectively. In Dura, the
Court erred in asserting that it was merely applying standard deceit
doctrines of economic loss and loss causation to fraud-on-the-market
claims. The same is true of Basic. Despite the Court's assertions to the
contrary, the fraud-on-the-market doctrine does something more than

create a special evidentiary rule for deceit claims in the special context

11.
12.

Id.
John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of Reliance in

Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001, 1004 (2006).
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of mass transactions. Rather, these decisions have articulated a new
tort: one that differs in substance from the wrong of deceit. 13
Third, we reject the contention that this new wrong, first
identified in Basic and refined in Dura and other decisions, is
exclusively a public-law wrong that imposes liability on a private
attorney general model. The Justices undoubtedly have had public
policy goals such as deterrence and compensation in mind in fashioning
securities fraud law. Still, we maintain in Part V that they have done
so by articulating (even if not quite explicitly) a new tort cause of action.
The issue of the Court's authority to identify implied rights of action in
federal statutes is, of course, hotly contested and is not one we engage
directly here. Instead, taking that general authority for granted, we
argue that the Court's use of it to fashion fraud on the market as a
distinct tort fits within a well-established common-law tradition of
recognizing torts other than deceit-including negligence causing
economic loss and tortious interference with prospective advantagewhen misrepresentations cause injury without victim reliance.
Some members of the current Court now seem keen to reverse
14
Basic, at least in part because they are skeptical about the tenability
of the fraud-on-the-market theory. If one accepts the premise that the
theory is only justifiable to the extent that it helps to implement the
reliance element of common-law deceit (which we do not), their
skepticism is understandable and indeed justified. But this basis for
skepticism is readily dispelled once one recognizes that "fraud on the
market" is not-despite what Basic claims-the name for a special
evidentiary rule that federal courts apply to the particular version of
deceit found in federal securities laws. Rather, fraud on the market is
its own tort-one that, unlike deceit, allows redress for intentional
misrepresentations that result in economic loss to investors,
irrespective of reliance.
Of course, there are other grounds on which one might question
judicial recognition of the fraud-on-the-market tort, including the
difficulty of distinguishing genuine victims from investors who
advisedly took a risk and have no grounds to complain. However, both
13. Our focus is specifically on 10b-5 claims that invoke Basic'sfraud-on-the-market doctrine.
10b-5 claims that do not invoke that doctrine often will, in substance, mirror claims for commonlaw deceit. In other words, the Court (in our view) has come to recognize at least two distinct
wrongs as privately actionable 10b-5 claims: a wrong closely akin to common-law deceit and the
distinct wrong of fraud on the market. See infra text accompanying notes 87-88 (distinguishing
between fraud-on-the-market cases and cases involving either nonpublic affirmative
misrepresentation or public misrepresentation where a plaintiff can prove actual reliance, which
more closely resemble common-law deceit).
14. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013) (Alito, J.,
concurring); id. at 1208 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Congress and the Court have shown themselves willing and able to
address this concern. Indeed, that concern provided much of the
impetus for the Court's effort in Dura to define economic loss and loss
causation. In sum, by grasping the distinctive nature of the tort that
goes under the name "fraud on the market," one comes to appreciate
both the justifiability of its recognition and the propriety of certain
efforts to limit its scope.
II. IMPERSONAL DECEIT

A. The Wrong of Deceit
The tort of deceit, also known as "fraud" or "intentional
misrepresentation," like all torts, proscribes conduct that is wrongful
and injurious. Specifically, it renders unlawful a knowing
misrepresentation intended to induce reliance by persons such as the
victim that succeeds in inducing such reliance. The elements of the tort
can be stated as follows: "a misrepresentation or a material omission of
fact which was false and known to be false by defendant, made for the
purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance
of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and
injury."I
In a prior article coauthored with Anthony Sebok, we devoted
attention to the reliance element of deceit, arguing that it plays a
distinct yet underappreciated role, which, if appreciated, sheds light on
how best to characterize this particular legal wrong.16 It is true that
reliance is the means through which a defendant's misrepresentation
harms the plaintiff. But, we argued, reliance is not a mere equivalent
to, say, the actual causation component of the tort of negligence. The
easiest way to appreciate this point is to observe that even if a
misrepresentation actually harms a victim, the victim has no claim for
deceit if she does not rely upon it.
Suppose, for example, a subcontractor uses low-quality
materials when building a home but knowingly misrepresents to the
general contractor that the materials are of suitable quality. The home
is finished and sold with no express representations made to the
purchaser other than that the house is newly constructed and contains
no known defects. Later, the owner is required to make costly repairs
because of the subcontractor's use of poor materials. Even if the
15. E.g., Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1370, 1373 (N.Y. 1996)
(citations omitted).
16. Goldberg, Sebok & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1001.
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subcontractor's misrepresentation was a necessary step in the sequence
that led to the owner's injury, the owner was not injured by relying on
the subcontractor's misrepresentations. Whatever claims the owner
might possess against the subcontractor, the owner will not have a
claim for deceit. The subcontractor did not defraud the owner.
The distinct role played by reliance in deceit, we argued, reflects
a structural feature common to all torts. Reliance is essential because
courts have defined deceit to be the particular wrong of duping or
tricking someone into entering into a transaction. A plaintiff who seeks
to prevail on a complaint about being duped must prove that she was
actually duped. It is not enough to prove that she was injured because
someone else was duped.17
In requiring the plaintiff to have been wronged in the requisite
manner, deceit is on par with negligence and every other tort. A
negligence plaintiff must prove something more than mere carelessness
"in the air" or carelessness toward other, differently situated persons.1 8
The plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct was careless as
to her (that is, persons situated as she was situated in relation to the
defendant's conduct). All torts are personal wrongs in this sense. A tort
plaintiff prevails by proving that the defendant wronged her by
committing a recognized tort. A tort plaintiff cannot prevail when the
conduct in question was injurious to her but wrongful only to someone
else. Hence, a deceit plaintiff must be able to say of the defendant: "You
tricked me!" As we explained,
[T]he core of the legal wrong that historically has been labeled "fraud" or "deceit" is the
wrong of interfering with a particular interest of the victim, namely her interest in
making certain kinds of choices in certain settings free from certain forms of
misinformation. . . . (Deceit] occurs when one person, through a knowing
misrepresentation of material fact, induces another to make a decision in a transactional
91
setting that she would not have otherwise made ...

B. ImpersonalDeceit
Because deceit is based on an interference with decisional
autonomy, requires proof of reliance, and is a centuries-old tort, 20 one
might suppose that it has little applicability to the modern world of
impersonal financial transactions. There is something to this instinct.
17. Id. at 1004-12.
18. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
19. Goldberg, Sebok & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1013.
20. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 356 (4th ed. 2002) (dating
the emergence of the tort of deceit to the 1700s); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, ReassessingDamages
in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348, 361-62 (2007) (discussing seventeenthcentury antecedents to the modern deceit action).
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Indeed, we will argue in Part IV that the Supreme Court has
distinguished the fraud-on-the-market version of securities fraud from
deceit largely because it has sought to provide redress for persons who
suffer economic loss without a corresponding interference with their
decisionmaking. Nonetheless, we want to caution against the further
suggestion that deceit and its requirement of individualized reliance
are somehow inherently ill-suited to address manipulation in modern
financial transactions. There are important instances of
misrepresentation that cause financial loss but do not amount to deceit,
yet this is not because deceit lacks applicability to transactions
conducted impersonally.
As is well known, courts long ago rejected the notion that a
viable claim of deceit requires privity between defendant and plaintiff.
At least under some circumstances, if the defendant intentionally or
knowingly transmits the substance of his misrepresentation to certain
persons with whom he does not communicate directly, any of them who
justifiably relies on the misinformation has a valid claim for deceit. 21 In
other words, it is not essential to a claim of deceit that the plaintiff
hears or receives the defendant's misrepresentation directly from the
defendant. What is essential is that the plaintiff relies on the substance
of the misrepresentation. The domain of deceit is not limited to face-toface interactions. It is limited to transactions in which the plaintiff
actually and justifiably relies on the content of a misrepresentation that
was knowingly made in order to influence the conduct of persons such
as the plaintiff.
The notion that deceit can generate only a relatively narrow
band of liability is most obviously rebutted by Central Bank of Denver
v. FirstInterstateBank of Denver22 and Stoneridge Investment Partners,
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 23 In both decisions, the Supreme Court
blocked plaintiffs' efforts to invoke doctrines drawn from the law of
deceit precisely because those doctrines promised to expand the reach
of federal securities fraud law. Allowing 10b-5 plaintiffs to rely on
doctrines such as aiding and abetting or civil conspiracy, the Court
reasoned, would inappropriately extend liability to a range of
background actors beyond primary wrongdoers. 24 Quite clearly, these

21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (1977) ("One who makes a fraudulent
misrepresentation is subject to liability to the persons or class of persons whom he intends or has
reason to expect to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation. . . .").
22. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (refusing to recognize 10b-5 claims of aiding and abetting
securities fraud).
23. 552 U.S. 148, 159-61 (2008) (rejecting "scheme liability" for securities fraud).
24. Id. at 162; Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 184.
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decisions demonstrate that the tort of deceit has potentially broad
applicability to the modern world of impersonal transactions. 25
III. FROM DECEIT TO FRAUD ON THE MARKET: DURA, ECONOMIC Loss,
AND Loss CAUSATION
In the course of discussing the place of reliance in deceit, our
earlier article touched very briefly on securities fraud. Our tentative
conclusion was that reliance is an element of claims for securities fraud
because "Congress and the courts have continued to conceive of private
rights of action for securities fraud as a means of empowering those who
have actually been defrauded to sue their defrauders." 26 In other words,
we supposed that 10b-5 actions, including fraud-on-the-market claims,
assert that the plaintiff was duped into making a losing transaction.
We now think we erred in too closely equating the wrong of
deceit with the subset of securities fraud claims that invoke Basic's
fraud-on-the-market theory.27 Although closely related, deceit and
fraud-on-the-market claims allege the commission of two distinct
wrongs. 28
The core difference between the two might be summarized as
follows. As we have seen, deceit protects one's right against being
tricked into a certain kind of transaction. As such, deceit is concerned
in the first instance with protecting the victim's decisional autonomy
from wrongful interference. By contrast, a fraud-on-the-market claim

25. It may be that the common law would recognize something like the limit on jointtortfeasor liability identified in Stoneridge. Professor Langevoort reads that decision to borrow a
page from the law of negligence by adopting a no-duty rule for securities fraud actions. Under this
rule, not everyone who "speaks" about the financial condition of a firm owes a duty to the market
to refrain from making misrepresentations in the course of so speaking. Rather, it is only speakers
who operate in the realm of finance-for the most part, those who appreciate better the risks and
responsibilities created by federal securities laws-who are charged with such a duty. Langevoort,
supra note 9, at 2137, 2154-56. In this respect, Langevoort argues Stoneridge meshes with state
courts' use of no-duty rules in negligence cases to prevent the imposition of liability that is grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the tortfeasor's wrongdoing. Id. at 2143-44.
We are inclined toward a somewhat different reading of the decision, in part because we
doubt that tort law, as a general matter, is especially concerned to ensure that liability is
proportionate to wrongdoing. Stoneridge instead seems to invoke (rightly or wrongly) a notion of
"superseding cause" in that it refuses to impose liability for an actor's knowing misrepresentations
about the financial condition of another actor when those misrepresentations are embedded or
subsumed within the other actor's own misrepresentations.
26. Goldberg, Sebok & Zipursky, supranote 16, at 1020.
27. Needless to say, we are here speaking for ourselves and not for Professor Sebok.
28. Although we ultimately draw a different distinction, our argument builds on Jill Fisch's
important analysis of the Supreme Court's Dura decision. See Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern:
Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 860-64 (2009) (analyzing the
Court's decisions in Basic and Durathrough the lens of tort law).
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vindicates a victim's right not to lose wealth as a result of trading in a
market tainted by deliberate misrepresentations. The latter injury
pertains in the first instance to economic well-being, not freedom from
manipulation. 29 Fraud-on-the-market claims are in this respect akin to
negligence claims seeking recovery for pure economic loss. However,
fraud-on-the market claims, unlike negligence claims, obviously require
a heightened showing of wrongdoing (intentional misrepresentations
designed to distort market prices rather than mere carelessness).
In this Part and the next, we will criticize two prominent
instances in which the Supreme Court has purported, erroneously, to
fashion the fraud-on-the-market tort in a manner that tracks the
contours of deceit. Within this Part, we consider the Court's claim in
Dura that it was merely applying common-law principles when it
required proof of economic loss and loss causation as a condition of
recovery for fraud on the market.30 The injury in deceit is that of having
been deceived into a decision, not economic loss per se. In fraud on the
market, though, it is the other way around. This is why proof of
economic loss and loss causation, as Dura defined those terms, have not
historically been essential to liability for deceit.
In Part IV, we will consider directly the place of reliance in
fraud-on-the-market claims. In particular, we examine what the Court
meant when it held in Basic that investor reliance can be "presumed"
for cases in which the fraud-on-the-market theory applies. 31 To get a
better sense of this holding, we first distinguish two kinds of
presumptions: those that aim simply to ensure the proper application
of substantive law in particular cases and those that aim to effect a
change in substantive law. We then argue that Basic's presumption of
reliance, though presented as being of the former sort, is in fact of the
latter. When a plaintiff invokes the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, she
is not claiming to have acted in reliance on the defendant's
misrepresentation. Rather, she is claiming that the defendant's
misrepresentation caused her to suffer economic loss by distorting the
market in which she traded.

29. John Coates has suggested to us that there is arguably a sense in which a decisionmaker's
autonomy is diminished whenever her decision is affected by misinformation. Accordingly, there
is some basis for asserting that fraud-on-the-market claims, like deceit claims, concern
interferences with autonomy. Even assuming this is so, one can still draw a qualitative distinction
between the sort of autonomy interference that is at the center of deceit, which involves a
defendant's exercise of control over the plaintiffs choice, and the interference that is at the center
of the fraud on the market, which does not.
30. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).

31.

485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
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A. Dura's Twin Holdings
In Dura, the plaintiffs alleged that they had purchased shares
in the defendant-company at a price inflated by the defendant's
knowing misrepresentations. 3 2 The complaint further alleged that the
misrepresentations later came to light and that this revelation caused
a brief dip in share price. 33 However, the complaint did not allege that
the plaintiffs sold their shares at this lower price.34 Instead, it sought
compensation for the difference between the purchase price and the
lower price the plaintiffs would have initially paid had the alleged
misrepresentations not been made.35
The Supreme Court held that these allegations were insufficient
to state a fraud-on-the-market claim. The Court reasoned that economic
loss and loss causation are essential elements of such a claim.36 The
Court then elaborated on these elements, observing that in an ordinary
case, "an inflated purchase price will not itself constitute or proximately
cause the relevant economic loss." 3 7 It is important to appreciate both
aspects of this proposition.
Dura'sfirst point is that a defendant's sale of stock to a plaintiff
at a price inflated by misrepresentations is not yet a completed instance
of securities fraud as federal law defines that wrong. 38 To be sure, the
defendant's action might eventually become an instance of securities
fraud. But that would only be the case if the plaintiff were to experience
certain further adverse consequences, such as economic losses resulting
from a sale of the shares at a price below the purchase price. 39
In this respect, the Court treated the plaintiffs allegations as
akin to some courts' treatment of negligence claims seeking
compensation for toxic exposures. 40 Suppose a negligence complaint
alleges that the plaintiff inhaled asbestos fibers because the owner of a
32. 544 U.S. at 339-40. The crucial alleged misrepresentation concerned Dura's prospects for
obtaining FDA approval of a spray device for delivering asthma medication.
33. Id. at 339.
34. Id. at 339-40.
35. Reply Brief at 2-3, Dura, 544 U.S. 336 (No. 03-932), 2004 WL 2988614.
36. 544 U.S. at 341-42.
37. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 342-43, 346-47.

39.

See Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-MarketActions, 31 J. CORP. L.

829, 846-62 (2006) (identifying questions left open by Dura as to what, beyond purchase at an
inflated price, can count as economic loss); see also Burch, supra note 20, at 360, 380-82 (noting
questions left open by Dura and arguing in favor of an out-of-pocket measure of damages on
deterrence grounds).
40. See Fisch, supra note 28, at 852-53 (noting that Dura can be read to treat purchases at
an inflated price as generating a risk of future harm to purchasers and that courts in personal
injury tort cases have been reluctant to treat risk of physical injury, itself, as a harm).
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nearby industrial plant was careless, but the complaint also
acknowledges that the plaintiff has not yet manifested any asbestosrelated illness. A court might deem this complaint legally deficient on
the ground that the inhalation of asbestos fibers, by itself, does not
constitute an injury so far as negligence law is concerned. 41 It is only if
the plaintiff later develops an illness as a result of the inhalation that
the defendant's carelessness ripens into the wrong of negligence.
Similarly, Dura seems to suppose that the purchase of shares in a
market distorted by the defendant's misrepresentation is not yet a
completed instance of securities fraud-the defendant has merely
exposed the purchaser to a risk of economic injury. So its initial
holding-expressed in terms of the plaintiffs purchase at an inflated
price failing to constitute economic loss-is that the plaintiffs had not
alleged the sort of setback that completes a fraud-on-the-market claim
of securities fraud.
The Court's second holding-that liability will attach only if the
defendant's misrepresentations "proximately cause" the plaintiffs
economic loss-identifies an additional limitation on fraud-on-themarket claims. Even if the plaintiffs sold their Dura shares at a price
below the inflated purchase price, that would not suffice to establish the
defendants' liability. Rather, the plaintiffs would also have to prove that
the price drop was attributable specifically to the market's reaction to
the revelation of the defendant's misrepresentations, as opposed to
other independent forces (such as a general economic downturn or a
coincidental exodus of key Dura employees).
Note that a defendant's alleged misrepresentations still operate
as an actual cause of the plaintiffs' losses even when intervening forces
such as these are at work. But for the misrepresentations, the plaintiffs
never would have purchased the shares and thus never would have
been at risk of losing money when the shares dropped, regardless of
what other events were necessary to generate that drop. However, an
actual causal connection, the Dura Court insisted, is not sufficient to
establish liability. If intervening events bring about the drop in share
price, the connection between the defendant's misrepresentations and
the plaintiffs losses will be too remote or fortuitous, and hence the
41. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88VA. L. REV. 1625,
1657-60 (2002) (discussing courts' reluctance to recognize risk imposition as a cognizable injury).
Some courts recognize claims for medical monitoring expenses incurred as a result of wrongful
conduct exposing the plaintiff to an increased risk of disease. See, e.g., Donovan v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 891, 901 (Mass. 2009) (defining the conditions under which a plaintiff can
recover medical monitoring costs from a defendant who wrongfully caused the plaintiff to incur
those costs). We have argued that claims of this form are not best understood as imposing liability
for completed torts, but instead seek a special form of pre-tort injunctive relief. Goldberg &
Zipursky, supra, at 1701-15.
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misrepresentations cannot be deemed to have "proximately cause[d]"
those losses.42
To reiterate, Dura holds that the mere purchase of shares at a
price inflated by a defendant's misrepresentations does not satisfy the
economic-loss element of the fraud-on-the-market cause of action. Thus,
a suit alleging only such a purchase fails to allege a completed instance
of securities fraud. Durafurther holds that even where the right sort of
loss is pleaded, the defendant's misrepresentation must also bring
about that loss in the right way-through the market's reaction to the
revelation of the defendant's misrepresentation, rather than through
forces operating independently of the misrepresentation.
B. Deceit and Economic Loss
The Court in Dura justified its twin holdings on several grounds.
We will focus here only on one: the claim that Dura'srendering of fraud
on the market tracks the common law's definition of deceit.
On the issue of what counts as economic loss, the Court reasoned
as follows:
Judicially implied private securities fraud actions resemble in many (but not all) respects
common-law deceit and misrepresentation actions. . . . And the common law has long
insisted that a plaintiff in such a case show not only that had he known the truth he would
not have acted but also that he suffered actual economic loss. See, e.g., Pasley v. Freeman,
3 T.R. 51, 65, 100 Eng. Rep. 450, 457 (1789) (if "no injury is occasioned by the lie, it is not
actionable: but if it be attended with a damage, it then becomes the subject of an action.");
Freeman v. Venner, 120 Mass. 424, 426 (1876) (a mortgagee cannot bring a tort action for
damages stemming from a fraudulent note that misrepresentation led him to execute
unless and until the note has to be paid) ... .

In support of the loss-causation requirement, the Court cited more
contemporary common-law authorities, including the Second
Restatement of Torts:
[T]he Restatement of Torts, in setting forth judicial consensus, says that a person who
"misrepresents the financial condition of a corporation in order to sell its stock" becomes
liable to a relying purchaser "for the loss" the purchaser sustains "when the facts ...
become generally known" and "as a result" share value "depreciate [s].44

Dura thus claimed that its rendering of the economic-loss element of
fraud-on-the-market claims merely instantiates the longstanding
common-law rule requiring deceit plaintiffs to plead and prove damage,
and that its loss-causation requirement tracks respectable authorities,
including the Second Restatement of Torts.

42.
43.
44.

Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.
Id. at 343-44 (citations omitted).
Id. at 344 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 548A

cmt. b (1977)).
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It may be that Dura's economic-loss and loss-causation
requirements are properly incorporated into fraud-on-the-market
claims as a matter of statutory interpretation or as reasonable
prudential limits on the scope of liability for such claims. 45 The Court
nonetheless erred in supposing that the common law of deceit provides
support for these requirements. If anything, Dura's insistence that
economic loss and loss causation are elements of fraud-on-the-market
claims establishes quite convincingly that this particular wrong, as the
Court (and perhaps Congress) has defined it, differs significantly in
substance from deceit.
Dura's invocation of the 1789 English decision Pasley v. Freeman
is understandable, for Pasley contains canonical language about the
need to prove damage in claims for deceit. In the words of Justice Buller,
"Fraud without damage, or damage without fraud, gives no cause of
action; but where these two concur, an action lies."4 6 This oft-quoted
phrase seems to support Dura'sinsistence that the plaintiffs prove that
they sold their shares at a loss attributable to the revelation of the
defendant's misrepresentations. And yet it does not.
To see where Dura went wrong, it will be helpful to distinguish
among three closely related and frequently conflated concepts: "injury,"
"damage," and "damages." "Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered."47 While courts and commentators have unhelpfully used
these terms inconsistently and interchangeably, attending to the
distinctions among them will permit a better understanding of the
Pasley principle.
Pasley's famous maxim emphasizes the need for proof of damage,
but its holding equally implicates the concept of injury. 48 The justices
in the majority were keen to emphasize that deceit, like every other tort,
requires more than misconduct by the defendant. There must also be
45. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 states that a plaintiff in a rule 10b5 case "shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant ... caused the
loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012).
46. Pasley v. Freeman, (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B.) 453; 3 Term Rep. 51, 56. For his
language, Justice Buller relied on the opinion of Justice Croke in Baily v. Merrell, (1615) 81 Eng.
Rep. 81 (K.B.) 81; 3 Bulst. 94, 95. However, Croke's language is somewhat confusing and possibly
confused. See Baily, 81 Eng. Rep. at 81 (suggesting that, for a case in which the owner and lessee
of a cart have agreed upon a price per load, after which the lessee overloads the cart, "an action
lieth for this fraud without damage,for damage without fraud gives no cause of action; but where
these two do concur and meet together, there an action lieth") (emphasis added).
47. Giammanco v. Giammanco, 625 N.E.2d 990, 997 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (quoting
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 303 (3d ed. 1969)).
48. Pasley, 100 Eng. Rep. at 455.
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the requisite effect on the plaintiff. The majority in turn broke down
this effect into two components. The first is the injury-the interference
with the plaintiffs right. The second is the damage- some relatively
concrete deleterious effect on the plaintiff flowing from the interference
with the right.
In Pasley, the defendant, Freeman, knowingly and falsely
reassured the plaintiffs that a third party, Falch, was creditworthy. In
reliance on Freeman's affirmations, the plaintiffs sold goods on credit
to Falch for which Falch never paid. Over a dissenter who maintained
that the defendant had merely offered his opinion as to Falch's
creditworthiness, the majority, including Justices Buller, Ashhurst,
and Kenyon, held that an action for deceit would lie. 4 9
Justice Buller described the deceit as the defendant's having
"procured the plaintiffs to sell goods on credit to one whom they would
not otherwise have trusted, by asserting that which he knew to be
false."50 Justice Ashhurst added that the plaintiffs had properly averred
a claim of deceit by alleging that the defendant, "intending to deceive
and defraud the plaintiffs, did deceitfully encourage and persuade them
to do the act, and for that purpose made the false affirmation, in
consequence of which they did the act."5 1 Note that on both these
descriptions, the wrong of deceit is completed or realized when the
plaintiff acts in justifiable reliance on the defendant's
misrepresentation.
For his part, Chief Justice Kenyon offered a seemingly puzzling
analogy on the issues of injury and damage (admittedly using those
terms interchangeably):
If, indeed, no injury is occasioned by the lie, it is not actionable: but if it be attended with
a damage, it then becomes the subject of an action. As calling a woman a whore, if she
sustain no damage by it, is not actionable; but if she loses her marriage by it, then she
52
may recover satisfaction in damages.

Kenyon here likens the deceit action to a particular kind of slander
claim: namely, one based on a statement that, though capable of
harming reputation, is not so facially defamatory that harm can be
presumed to have followed from its utterance.53 A plaintiff alleging this
49. Id. at 450-51.
50. Id. at 455.
51. Id. at 456.
52. Id. at 457.
53. Facially defamatory slander, for which damage is presumed, is classified as slander per
se. At the time of Pasley and, indeed, until the end of the nineteenth century, "a statement
imputing unchastity to a woman, or even professional unchastity, was not considered slanderous
per se." Hollman v. Brady, 233 F.2d 877, 877 (9th Cir. 1956) (footnote omitted). The rule was
changed by legislation in England in 1891. Id. at 877-78.
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sort of slander was (and still is) required to prove not only that the
defendant verbally communicated a statement about her that was
capable of damaging her reputation, but also that the communication
caused her to suffer "special damages," that is, some concrete or
tangible loss. 54
One might suppose that Kenyon's slander analogy supports
Dura's reading of Pasley. After all, it seems to suggest that a fraud
plaintiff must come to court with evidence demonstrating that things
really did go badly for her, which is what the Supreme Court wanted to
see from the Dura plaintiffs. But the analogy cuts the other way. The
insistence on proof of a further deleterious consequence in the slander
cases flows from a particular understanding of the nature of the right
undergirding the slander tort. The injury in slander is the plaintiffs
suffering a reputational hit, irrespective of whether it produces further
negative consequences for the plaintiff, such as the loss of a business
opportunity. That is, the law defines slander in such a way that the
wrong is realized at the moment at which a third party thinks less of
the plaintiff because of the defendant's utterance of defamatory
remarks about the plaintiff.
If so, why do courts require some slander plaintiffs to offer proof
of special damages, such as the proof of a ruined marriage that Justice
Kenyon contemplated? The answer is partly epistemic. Evidence of
special damages supports an inference that the defendant's statement
had the effect one would expect a defamatory statement to have; it
really did cause others to think worse of the plaintiff. Additionally,
courts have long worried that making available a cause of action for
slander will encourage suits by complainants who are merely outraged
over having been insulted or humiliated. While courts have long
insisted that insults do not count as defamatory speech and hence are
not a basis for liability, the requirement of proof of special damages has
served to reinforce this limit on liability.55
Finally, and most importantly, the special-damages
requirement for non-per se slander claims is grounded in a judgment
about the relative importance of allowing individuals redress for
different kinds of rights violations. The right to bodily integrity at the
center of the tort of battery, along with the right to exclude that is at
the heart of trespass to land, has been deemed important enough to
54. Typically, special damages are proven by showing loss of wealth, loss of a job, or loss of a
concrete opportunity resulting from the defamation. Liberman v. Gelstein, 605 N.E.2d 344, 347
(N.Y. 1992) ("Special damages contemplate 'the loss of something having economic or pecuniary
value.'" (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 cmt. b (1977))).
55. See BAKER, supra note 2020, at 440-42 (discussing common-law courts' concern over the
abuse of defamation actions and steps they took to prevent such abuse).
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warrant its vindication irrespective of whether a given interference has
generated follow-on, concrete harm. This is why a battery plaintiff can
recover for an offensive but harmless touching and why a trespass
plaintiff can recover damages without suffering tangible property
damage.5 6 So long as there has been a "touching" of the right sort, there
is an actionable tort. However, courts will not deem valid certain claims
of slander without a showing of follow-on losses. In their eyes, the right
not to have one's reputation besmirched by spoken words has not
warranted the fulsome protection given to bodily integrity and the right
to exclude others from one's property.
For similar reasons, courts dealing with claims of deceit have
insisted on proof of damage beyond proof of injury. The presence of
follow-on damage attests indirectly to the plausibility of the plaintiffs
claim that she was duped. Courts probably have also worried that the
availability of the deceit action will fuel a tendency among remorseful
buyers and sellers to transform their disappointment into accusations
of wrongdoing. Most importantly, courts long ago concluded that
interference with decisional autonomy is not the sort of interference
56. See, e.g., Jacques v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997) (holding that a
trespass to land does not require damage to plaintiffs property to be actionable). Admittedly, in
1841, the New York Supreme Court once analogized deceit claims to claims for trespass to land:
"When a man is drawn into a contract of sale or demise by fraud, a right of action attaches
immediately, as much so as if trespass had been committed against him. . . ." Allaire v. Whitney,
1 Hill 484, 486 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
Tony Sebok has pressed us to consider the relation between the requirement of proof of
damage in deceit and the requirement of proof of damage in actions for trespass to chattels. This
turns out to be a question that warrants more attention than we can give it here.
Early on, some courts in the U.S. distinguished claims for trespass to chattels from claims
for trespass to land by requiring proof of damage to render the former actionable. See, e.g.,
Marentille v. Oliver, 2 N.J.L. 379, 380 (1808) (stating that a trespass to chattel requires the
plaintiff to establish damage to the chattel). This view seems to have been adopted by the Second
Torts Restatement .RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e (1965). One might thus suppose
that the damage requirement in trespass to chattels offers another (and more direct) analogue to
the damage requirement in deceit than does the requirement of proof of special damages in
slander. There may be something to this. In Marentille,for example, the court seems concerned to
keep out of the courts de minimis trespass to chattels claims, such as a claim by P that D struck
Ps horse without injuring the horse. 2 N.J.L. at 380.
However, this line of reasoning is complicated by at least two countervailing
considerations. First, although the issue apparently did not often arise, English courts seem to
have been prepared to treat claims for trespass to land and to chattels comparably, such that proof
of damage was not required for either. See, e.g., FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A
TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAW

220-21 (1887) (noting the courts' symmetrical treatment of trespass to land and chattels). Second,
at least according to the Second Restatement, today, damage is treated as an element of a claim
for trespass to chattels rather than a condition of actionability standing apart from the elements
of the tort. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra. It is possible that, in fashioning the
Restatement, the ALI glossed over the distinction between elements and conditions of
actionability, but this is an issue requiring further exploration.
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that warrants recognizing claims merely upon evidence of such
interference. Rather, it is only if the interference generates a concrete
setback that it becomes sufficiently important to justify making the
courts available to a plaintiff pursuing a claim of fraud.5 7
The important point is this: proof of damage was understood as
a prudential limit designed to screen out valid but de minimis deceit
claims, not as an element of the wrong of deceit.58 The tort was
understood to be complete just as soon as there was an interference with
the plaintiffs right to decisional autonomy. In the words of Lord Justice
Stephenson:
[I]t is settled law that A's misrepresentation, however fraudulent and morally wrong, does
not become tortious until B not merely receives it but acts upon it. The damage may be
suffered when and where B acts or begins to act upon the representation, but it may be
suffered at a later time and at a different place. Although A's part of the tort is committed
when and where he speaks or . . . writes the misrepresentation, B's part is needed to
complete the tort by acting upon the representation, and the tort is committed, in my
59
judgment, when and where he does so act.

And yet, without proof of particularized damage, there was insufficient
reason for a court to get involved. Thus we find Stephenson concurring
with his predecessor Kenyon on the analogy between claims for slander
and for deceit: "In deceit, as in slander, the false representation or (in
most cases) the defamatory publication has to cause damage to be
actionable, but no damage to the plaintiff is necessary for the tort to be
committed."60 When Justice Buller in Pasley insisted that there cannot
57. Using the language of duty and injury, rather than right, injury, and damage, Arthur
Sedgwick similarly distinguished deceit from battery and false imprisonment. Whereas courts will
vindicate claims for interferences with a plaintiffs right not to be subjected to inappropriate
touches, or to be confined merely upon proof of a violation of one of those rights, they require a
more substantial showing from a plaintiff alleging an interference with his decisional autonomy.
ARTHUR G. SEDGWICK, ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS AND

PRACTITIONERS 204-05 (2d ed. 1909) ("The duty to tell the truth, unlike the duty not to invade the
rights of personal security di personal liberty, is recognized by the law only when it becomes
productive of injury, either substantial or to a legal right.").
58. This is why, when a slander plaintiff proves special damages-that is, a concrete effect
such as the loss of her marriage or the loss of wealth attributable to the defamation-she recovers
compensation not only for these items, but also "general damages" meant to compensate for the
harm to reputation itself. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 cmt. a (1977).
59. Diamond v. The Bank of London & Montreal, [1979] Q.B. 333, 349 (citations omitted).
60. Id. (emphasis added). Some English authorities that follow Pasley arguably collapse the
issue of damage into the issue of injury, thereby eliminating the need for corroborating evidence
of damage to establish the injury. For example, Lord Blackburn in Smith v. Chadwick, (1884) 9
App. Cas. 187 (H.L.) 195, cites Pasley for the proposition that damage is an element of deceit. Id.
Yet Blackburn concludes that if the plaintiff proves that "he did act upon [the defendant's
misleading] representations, he shews damage." Id. at 196.
In 4 Eng. Ltd. v. Harper, [2007] EWHC (Ch) 1568, [50], the defendants argued that even
if their misrepresentations induced the plaintiff to buy their company at an inflated price, there
remained a triable issue of whether plaintiffs losses were fully recouped under a set-off specified
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be a cause of action for fraud without damage, he was not treating
"damage" as an element of the plaintiffs prima facie case, but instead
requiring it to substantiate the plaintiffs' allegations that their decision
to sell goods to Flach was not authentically theirs, and to establish that
the stakes were sufficient for a court to get involved.
An appreciation of Pasley's emphasis on proof of damage as a
token of the authentic and sufficiently serious nature of the interference
with the plaintiffs autonomy helps to clarify certain features of the law
of deceit. First, the requirement of proof of concrete damage dissipates
(or, perhaps, disappears) when the plaintiffs suit does not seek
compensatory damages but instead aims to undo the fraudulently
induced transaction and return both parties to the status quo ante.61
The plaintiffs entitlement to rescission and restitution rests on the
defendant's commission of the wrong of deceit; in other words, the
plaintiffs having been induced to enter into a transaction through
justifiable reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation. But when the
plaintiff merely wishes to unwind the transaction, the ordinary
requirement of proof of damage is waived.
Second, and more importantly for present purposes, Pasley's
notion of damage has long been construed flexibly and modestly. 62 On
this understanding, courts are essentially asking deceit plaintiffs to
demonstrate that something of significance is at stake beyond the mere
possibility of interference with the plaintiffs autonomy. Indeed, at least
one line of English decisions flowing directly out of Pasley suggests that
damage can be proven merely by establishing that, for the transaction
in the contract of sale. Justice Briggs for the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice, relying
in part on Smith v. Chadwick, rejected this argument as a ground for denying that the defendants
had committed deceit:
Here the tort of deceit was complete. . .when the [plaintiff] entered into the agreement
to buy the [defendant's company]. The question is whether it matters that there may be
an arguable case that the claimant had fully recouped its loss. . . . That question only
goes to the assessment of damages.... In my judgment, it is sufficiently clear that there
is a completed cause of action in deceit at the time of the sale agreement....
Id.
61. See Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution
Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 367 & n.65 (1984) (arguing for the availability
of restitution in securities fraud cases and noting common-law deceit cases "in which the court
permitted rescission and restitution even absent a showing that defendant's misrepresentation
caused the plaintiffs pecuniary harm-a showing required for tort damages."); see also WILLIAM
L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 90, at 770 (1st ed. 1941); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 13 cmts. c & e (2010) (noting that a transfer can be
invalidated upon a showing that the defendant's misrepresentation induced the transfer and
without regard to whether plaintiff can show economic injury).
62.

WILLIAM W. KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FRAUD AND MISTAKE 94 (1872) (footnotes

omitted) ("Fraud without damage is not sufficient to support an action or to be a ground for relief
in equity. But it is enough if the representation operates to the prejudice of a man to a very small
extent. Fraud gives a cause of action if it leads to any sort of damage.").
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in question, the plaintiff parted with a thing of value on the basis of the
defendant's misrepresentation. In other words, one who shows
detrimental reliance-the giving over or unconditional promising of
value-has shown sufficient damage to confirm that she has suffered
the sort of interference with autonomy that counts as a deceit. Lord
Justice Hobhouse states this point in Downs v. Chappell: "For a plaintiff
to succeed in the tort of deceit it is necessary for him to prove that (1)
the representation was fraudulent, (2) it was material and (3) it induced
the plaintiff to act (to his detriment)." 63
As noted above, Dura cites Freeman v. Venner, 64 an early
Massachusetts decision, for the claim that common-law deceit demands
a showing of economic loss as defined by the Court. Admittedly a terse
and dense decision, Freeman does not hold anything so specific.
Freeman had loaned $3,500 to two debtors. The loan was evidenced by
a note and secured by a mortgage on certain land. A few months later,
Freeman assigned the note and the mortgage to Venner. By "mistake
and inadvertence on his part and through the false and fraudulent
representations of the defendant," Freeman endorsed the note "in
blank."65 Doing so rendered him a guarantor of the debt-if the debtors
defaulted on the loan and the mortgaged land was insufficient to cover
the debt, Freeman would be personally liable to Venner for the shortfall.
Freeman realized that he had mistakenly assumed this obligation and
sought to qualify his endorsement, but Venner refused to allow the
qualification and instead, over Freeman's objections, sold the note and
mortgage to a third party named Tenney.
Freeman promptly sued Venner for conversion of the note.
Sometime after the filing of Freeman's suit but before its resolution, the
debtors defaulted on an interest payment due under the loan. In
response, Tenney, now the holder of the note and mortgage, arranged
for the mortgaged land to be sold in partial satisfaction of the
underlying debt. Tenney then sued Freeman as guarantor on the note
for the portion of the debt not covered by the proceeds of the sale. While
Tenney's suit against Freeman as guarantor was still pending, the trial
judge presiding over Freeman's conversion claim against Venner
awarded Freeman damages equal to the amount that Tenney sought
from Freeman.66
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed. It
reasoned that the note had been lawfully transferred to Venner, not
63.
64.
65.
66.

[1997] 1 W.L.R. 426, 433.
Freeman v. Venner, 120 Mass. 424, 424 (1876).
Id.
Id. at 426-27.
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converted, and hence lawfully resold to Tenney. The Court
acknowledged Freeman's allegation that Venner had fraudulently
obtained Freeman's unrestricted endorsement on the note. However, it
concluded that this allegation was not ripe for adjudication when
Freeman first sued. At the moment of filing, the Court reasoned,
Freeman's liability as guarantor was still inchoate; he had not yet been
sued by Tenney, much less been held liable on the guarantee, and in
principle he might never have been subject to liability as guarantor (if,
for example, the debtors fulfilled their obligation to pay the note). In
short, until Freeman was actually made to pay on the fraudulently
induced guarantee,
[t]here will have been no concurrence of damage with fraud, within the rule on which such
actions are founded. And as there has been no invasion of the plaintiffs right, no breach
of promise, and no interference with his property, there can be no recovery of even nominal
67
damages in this action.

Freeman's claim was problematic, according to the Supreme Judicial
Court, because it was premature. This helps to explain why the Dura
Court could plausibly invoke Freemanin support of the contention that
the Dura plaintiffs had pleaded an inchoate or unrealized case of
securities fraud.68
Still, the cases are distinguishable. Freeman was not
complaining about being duped into transferring his rights under the
note and the mortgage. Rather, he was complaining about being tricked
into assuming the role of guarantor. The right against being tricked to
enter into that sort of role, the Freeman Court reasoned, is not
interfered with until the obligations attending that role are triggered.
One who is induced to purchase or sell goods or money by another's
misrepresentation can claim a rights violation just as soon the
transaction takes place, and perhaps as soon as one is unconditionally
bound to enter into the transaction through a contract. By contrast,
because guarantees are by their nature conditional obligations, one who
is induced to issue a guarantee cannot claim a rights violation until
actually called upon to live up to the guarantee. This is why, according
to the court, Freeman had not only failed to allege damage, but had
further failed to allege even an injury (i.e., an "invasion of [his] right").
The true analogue to Freeman, in other words, would have been a case
in which the Dura plaintiffs claimed to have been tricked into entering
into an agreement that conditionally obligated them to purchase Dura's
stock at an inflated price but then sued before the condition triggering
that obligation kicked in.
67.
68.

Id. at 427.
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344 (2005).
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Neither Pasley nor Freeman introduced into the law of deceit
Dura's narrow conception of economic loss, nor do they support the
notion that a claim for deceit is inchoate upon the occurrence of the
transaction induced by the defendant's misrepresentation. Insofar as
state-court decisions dismiss deceit claims for lack of damage under
Pasley, they do so on the ground that by failing to show any plausible
conception of what might count as damage, the claimant did not present
sufficient evidence of an injury worthy of judicial resolution, even
assuming that he had been deceived by the defendant.69 That Dura's
notion of economic loss was not a component of the common law of deceit
is also evidenced by decisions affirming judgments for deceit plaintiffs
alleging exactly the sort of damage that Dura deemed not to count as
economic loss (i.e., damage in the form of purchase at an inflated price).
Notably, these decisions involved not only fraud with respect to the
purchase of tangible goods, such as livestock, 70 but also involved fraud
with respect to the purchase of shares.71
69. Gaffney v. Graf, 238 P. 1054, 1055 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1925) (holding that a car dealer
cannot recover in fraud based on a customer's misrepresentation that his trade-in was from an
earlier model year than represented; there was no evidence that the dealer suffered a loss as a
result of the misrepresentation); Alden v. Wright, 49 N.W. 767, 768 (Minn. 1891) (providing that
if defrauded purchasers of stock received stock that was in fact worth what the plaintiff gave for
it, no fraud action will lie); Castleman v. Stryker, 213 P. 436, 439-40 (Or. 1923) (stating that
parties alleging that they were tricked into buying a business must offer evidence that on the date
of sale, the business was worth less than the amount paid); Nye v. Merriam, 35 Vt. 438, 444 (1862)
(holding that plaintiff suffered no damage from defendant's fraud once the defendant promised to
make up for any underpayment resulting from the fraud).
70. See Miller v. Wilson, 381 S.W.2d 31, 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (holding that deceit plaintiff
was entitled to bring claim based on difference between value of cow actually purchased and cow
as misrepresented by the defendant); Salmon v. Brookshire, 301 S.W.2d 48, 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957)
(providing that buyer who paid inflated price for a cow based on defendant's misrepresentations
has a valid claim for fraud); White v. Mowbray, 3 N.Y.S. 225, 226 (Sup. Ct. 1888) (finding a deceit
plaintiff entitled to recover purchase price plus expenses incurred in caring for diseased horse sold
to plaintiff by defendant); Maynard v. Maynard, 49 Vt. 297, 301 (1877) (stating that a seller of
impotent bull was liable to deceived buyer for all damages which resulted directly from the buyer's
inability to use the bull for purposes contemplated at the time of sale).
71. See, e.g., Sriver v. Maley, 151 N.E.2d 518, 521-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1958) (finding that
although fraud without damage is not actionable, evidence that the defendants hid certain debts
owed by their company establishes that the plaintiff suffered damage by paying an inflated price
for shares in the company); Menefee v. Blitz, 179 P.2d 550, 564 (Or. 1947) (providing that the
measure of damages for deceit in sale of stock is difference between sum paid and value at time of
purchase); Shine v. Dodge, 157 A. 318, 319 (Me. 1931) (stating, in dictum, that a deceit plaintiff in
a sale of stock case was entitled to the difference between the actual value of the property at the
time of the purchase and its value as if it had been represented); Nielsen v. Hansford, 242 P. 677,
678 (Colo. 1926) (holding that a plaintiff who was misled into purchasing stock properly alleged
damage in that stock, at the time of purchase, was of lesser value than represented); Johnson v.
Niles Invisible Door Check Co., 222 Ill. App. 65, 68 (1921) (noting that standard rules of damages
for deceit apply to claim based on sale of stock); Chapman v. Bible, 137 N.W. 533, 534 (Mich. 1912)
(allowing stock purchaser to recover damages notwithstanding that stock was selling at a higher
price than the inflated purchase price paid by plaintiff); see also Neiheisel v. Malone, 375 P.2d 197,
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Let us sum up our analysis so far. Dura erroneously asserts that
its economic-loss requirement is supported by the longstanding
recognition of damage (conceived as concrete economic loss) as an
element of the common-law tort of deceit. Damage so conceived is not an
element of the tort of deceit. Deceit plaintiffs have been required to
prove damage to recover compensatory damages. But this is because
damage has served as a prudential filter by which judges have excluded
certain well-formed but trivial deceit claims. Contra Dura, the tort of
deceit has long been understood to be complete or realized when the
plaintiff justifiably relies on the defendant's
intentional
misrepresentation. However, if a deceit plaintiff who seeks
compensatory damages fails to allege and prove that he suffered
concrete economic losses as a result of the deception, courts will deem
the matter de minimis and refuse to entertain it.
By this description, Dura's mistake might seem merely
academic-a matter only of the Court having put damage in the wrong
conceptual box. But the mistake is more significant than that. Precisely
because courts have understood proof of damage as a pragmatic filter
designed to exclude de minimis claims, they have approached the
question of proof of loss with considerable flexibility. Certainly they
have not insisted on the exacting conception of economic loss invoked
by Dura.
More fundamentally, the Court in Durafailed to appreciate that,
by adopting a particular and narrow conception of economic loss as an
element of fraud-on-the-market claims, it was defining that cause of
action on terms that render it quite distinct from deceit. Deceit is a
wrong based on an interference with autonomy: a deceit plaintiff
complains about having been tricked into making a decision she would
not otherwise have made. By contrast, under Dura, the wrong of
securities fraud-or at least the fraud-on-the-market version of that
wrong-is not an autonomy-based wrong, but an economic tort. A fraudon-the-market plaintiff, like a plaintiff alleging negligence causing pure
economic loss, complains of losses caused by the defendants'
manipulation of the market. The fact that the plaintiff was tricked
might provide the causal link between the defendant's manipulation
and her losses, but being tricked is no longer the gist of the wrong. As
we discuss below, Dura thus further crystallized a doctrinal schism
between deceit and securities fraud that traces all the way back to Basic

198 (Colo. 1962) (requiring deceit plaintiffs seeking damages, rather than rescission, to offer
evidence as to the value of the stock purchased and what the stock "might have been worth" had
the defendant not made misrepresentations).
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v. Levinson's initial recognition of fraud-on-the-market claims under
10b-5.
C. Deceit and Loss Causation
Under Dura,a fraud-on-the-market plaintiff who can prove that
she suffered economic loss must further prove that the loss flowed from
the defendant's misrepresentation in the right way. Specifically, the
plaintiff must prove that her injury occurred because the market
absorbed the putative facts that the defendant had misrepresented, as
opposed to some other independent force.
As we noted above, the Dura Court relied primarily on the
Second Restatement of Torts, which transplanted the language of "legal
cause" from negligence into deceit. 72 Specifically, section 548A excludes
liability for deceit if the losses suffered by the plaintiff come about in a
fortuitous or entirely unexpected manner.73 Commentary to that section
illustrates this principle with the example of a purchaser who is tricked
into buying shares in a company, the value of which drops only because
of the unexpected death of key company employees: "Although the
misrepresentation has in fact caused the loss . . . it is not a legal cause

of the loss for which the maker is responsible."74
Dura's invocation of section 548A's legal cause requirement
turns out to rest on a subtle mistake. It is true that the section specifies
legal cause as an element of claims for deceit. It is also true that the
aforementioned illustration suggests that this element would defeat a
claim by a purchaser of shares very much resembling the purchasers in
Dura. But critically, neither section 548A nor the illustration
presupposes, as Dura does, that deceit plaintiffs generally must plead
and prove "economic loss" as Dura defines that phrase. Rather, the
illustration simply assumes that the plaintiff in the imagined case has
opted to sue for economic loss of that sort. Insofar as the plaintiff is
seeking compensatory damages for selling at a loss, the illustration
maintains, the plaintiff must be prepared to show that the loss is not
attributable to the coincidental operation of forces independent of the
defendant's misrepresentation. But there is no suggestion that a deceit
plaintiff must always establish economic loss of this sort to prevail.
72. See supra note 44. Years before serving as Reporter for the Second Restatement, Prosser
in his torts treatise had introduced a notion of proximate cause into his description of deceit.
PROSSER, supra note 61, at 769 (stating that a fraud plaintiff must establish that the damage sued
upon was proximately caused by the defendant's misrepresentation). No "legal cause" restriction
on liability for deceit is stated in the First Torts Restatement.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A (1977).
74. Id. at cmt. b.
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Indeed, section 549 of the Second Restatement states that a
deceit plaintiff can recover "the difference between the value of what he
has received in the transaction and its purchase price or other value
given for it."'7 Commentary to this section further explains that this
kind of loss consists of "the difference between the price paid . . . and

the value of the thing acquired," with the latter determined by "the price
at which it could be resold . . . if its quality or other characteristics that

affect its value were known." 7 6 On these terms, it is perfectly viable for
a deceit plaintiff to allege purchase at an inflated price as the relevant
damage that is needed to render her claim legally cognizable.
To be sure, section 548A treats legal cause as an element of all
deceit claims and hence requires a plaintiff alleging damage in the form
of purchase at an inflated price-no less than the plaintiff in the Duralike illustration to the section-to establish that her losses did not
result from the coincidental operation of independent forces. But when
the allegation of damage is payment at an inflated price, the legal cause
requirement is obviously satisfied and hence a nonissue-much like
proximate cause is an element of, but also a nonissue for, a negligence
case in which a pedestrian who was lawfully crossing a public street
sues the careless driver who ran her down. In this imagined negligence
case, the causal connection between the .defendant's careless driving
and the plaintiffs injury is so obviously not serendipitous that there is
nothing to discuss under the heading of proximate cause-the element
is clearly satisfied. The same goes for legal cause in a case of deceit in
which the damage alleged is payment at an inflated price.
In short, the Dura Court could have fairly invoked section 548A
for two propositions, neither of which was sufficient to resolve the case
before it. The first states that legal cause is an element of the tort of
deceit. The second states that, insofar as a deceit plaintiff claims that
her damage consists of selling a good at a price below the inflated price
that she paid, the legal cause element is not satisfied if the lower sales
price resulted from forces operating independently of the defendant's
misrepresentation. One can only arrive at Dura's conclusion by adding
to these two a third proposition-namely, that the purchase of a good
at a price inflated by the defendant's misrepresentation is not itself
damage within the meaning of the law of deceit. As we have seen,
however, this third proposition is indefensible as a descriptive matter;

75. Id. § 549(1)(a); see Fisch, supranote 28, at 842-43 (noting that section 549's treatment of
the measure of damages for fraud claims seems consistent with judicial decisions prior to Dura,
which treated the damage as consisting of overpayment).
76.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,

§ 549 cmt. c (1977).
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the law of deceit has recognized purchase at an inflated price as
damage.77
There is another problem with Dura'sinvocation of section 548A,
though this is admittedly a problem internal to the Restatement's
treatment of deceit. Section 548A claims that its legal cause
requirement is analogous to the requirement of legal (or proximate)
cause in negligence. This analogy is problematic for two reasons.
First, section 548 imposes a foreseeability limit on liability even
though deceit is an intentional tort. Foreseeability poses an intelligible
limit on negligence liability precisely because the gist of negligence is
injuring someone through a failure to take care to avoid conduct that
poses an undue risk of injury. When one is trying to determine whether
taking a particular risk counts as a breach of a duty of care, and
whether that breach proximately caused an injury, it is entirely natural
and appropriate to invoke notions of foreseeability. Most obviously, if
an actor's conduct posed only an unforeseeable risk of injury to persons
such as the plaintiff, then there is no ground for asserting that the actor
was careless as to the plaintiff for failing to take appropriate
precautions. By contrast, when the gist of the wrong is an intentional
harming of another, the propriety of posing a liability limit based on
foreseeability is less obvious.78 Indeed, it may be that the Restatement
was departing from the traditional common law in offering a rule that
excludes liability for deceit that causes losses in an unforeseeable
manner.79
Second, and more fundamentally, proximate cause in negligence
is an element of the wrong. When a court concludes that a defendant's
carelessness was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, the
court is asserting that the defendant did not actually commit the tort of
negligence and thus cannot be held liable. As noted above, however, the
tort of deceit is very different from the tort of negligence. A negligence
plaintiff complains of having wrongfully suffered bodily harm, property
damage, emotional distress, or economic loss. Until such harm is
experienced, the tort is not complete. A deceit plaintiff, by contrast,
complains of a wrongful interference with her decisional autonomy.
This wrong is completed when the plaintiff justifiably acts upon the
defendant's intentional misrepresentation.
77. See supra notes 69-70 (citing deceit cases that treat purchase at an inflated price as
damage).
78. See Fisch, supra note 28, at 831-32 (discussing the awkwardness of importing proximate
cause principles drawn from negligence into the law of deceit).
79. See Mark P. Gergen, Causation in Disgorgement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 827, 839 (2012) ("Under
the traditional common-law rule, a wrongdoer generally bears the loss unless the cause is wholly
unrelated to the deception.").

2013]

THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET TORT

1781

It follows that the question of whether and how the plaintiff
suffered economic loss as a result of interference with her decisional
autonomy is not a question about whether the wrong of deceit has been
committed-it has.80 Rather, it is a question about the scope or extent
of the defendant's liability. In other words, it is a question of the extent
of damages a deceit defendant can properly be made to pay for having
wronged the plaintiff, not a question of whether the defendant has
committed a wrong in the first place.
This distinction, too, is not merely taxonomic or conceptual. In
tort law, the rules pertaining to computation of damages do not always
treat fortuitous causation as cutting against the plaintiffs claim. Most
famously, the "thin skull rule" permits a successful negligence plaintiff
to recover compensation even for injuries of an unforeseeable
magnitude. 8 ' Thus, a defendant whose carelessness causes injury to the
plaintiff by mere fortuity is spared liability altogether under the
doctrine of proximate cause, but a defendant whose carelessness
nonfortuitously causes injury to a plaintiff can be held liable even for
damage of an unforeseeable magnitude.
One of several possible justifications for this difference between
rules determining liability and rules determining damages is that tort
law embraces a principle somewhat akin to criminal law's presumption
of innocence. In determining whether an actor has committed a tort
such as negligence, the law, to a certain degree, protects actors from
fortuities. But once one is deemed a tortfeasor, one forfeits one's
entitlement to the law's solicitousness. To recognize that section 548A's
legal cause requirement is more appropriately analogized to rules of
damages than to proximate cause rules is thus to recognize that the
requirement should be framed and applied flexibly, not rigidly.
Our point is not that tort law always saddles tortfeasors with
liability for unforeseeable losses. Rather, it is that tort law contains
some prominent remedial rules that allow for such liability. And this in
turn suggests that courts have leeway to incorporate these principles in
sculpting the 10b-5 tort. Hence, once again, the Dura Court erred in
80. Indeed, it would be bizarre to suggest that the purchaser in section 548A's illustration
has not been the victim of deceit. In justified reliance on the defendant's intentional
misrepresentations, the plaintiff exchanged money for shares. This is not misrepresentation in the
air, nor is it "fraud without damage." KERR, supranote 62, at 94. Nor was the plaintiffs purchasing
of the shares an unforeseen consequence of the defendant's misrepresentations. Quite the
opposite-it was an intended consequence. There is nothing missing here; we have an instance of
deceit. This much seems clear from the fact that the plaintiff could, from the moment of the
purchase, seek rescission on the basis of the deceit.
81. See, e.g., Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891) (holding that a tortfeasor is
liable for losses resulting from his tortious conduct even if, because of a hidden vulnerability in the
plaintiff, their magnitude was unforeseeable).
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claiming that by requiring proof of loss causation, it was merely
following the dictates of the common law. 82 Moreover this error-no less
than the error of supposing that deceit requires economic lossindicates that the Court has (deliberately or unintentionally) recast
fraud-on-the-market securities fraud as an economic tort. Section
548A's illustration of legal cause served as the focal point for the Court's
analysis precisely because it has come to view fraud on the market as
the wrongful causation of economic loss rather than the tricking of a
plaintiff into making a certain kind of decision.
IV. FROM DECEIT TO FRAUD ON THE MARKET: BASIC AND THE
PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE

In Basic, the Supreme Court famously insisted that 10b-5
claims, like claims for deceit, include the element of reliance. 83 At the
same time, it characterized reliance as "provid[ing] the requisite causal
connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs
injury" and emphasized that "[t]here is . . . more than one way to

demonstrate the causal connection." 84 Reliance qua causation, the
Court continued, can be presumed in certain cases, namely, those
involving shares bought and sold in efficient markets.85 Even where
applicable, however, the presumption of reliance is rebuttable.86
Preliminarily, it is worth reiterating that Basic and its
progeny-despite their importance and visibility-establish only one
type of privately actionable 10b-5 claim. As the Court emphasized in its
2008 Stoneridge decision, there is a substantial domain of 10b-5 cases
involving nonpublic affirmative misrepresentations that do not fit the
mold of fraud-on-the-market claims and do not afford plaintiffs a
presumption of reliance. 87 Additionally, plaintiffs in public
82. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343-44 (2005) (noting that private
securities fraud actions resemble common-law deceit actions, where plaintiffs must show "actual
economic loss").
83. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
84. Id.
85. See id. at 243-44 (noting that interpretation of the rule 10b-5 reliance requirement should
take note of the difference between "the face-to-face transactions contemplated by early fraud
cases" and those taking place in modern securities markets.)
86. Id. at 245.
87. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008):
Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant's deceptive acts is an essential element of
the § 10(b) private cause of action. . . . We have found a rebuttable presumption of
reliance in two different circumstances [citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 247; Affliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972)]... .Neither presumption applies
here. Respondents had no duty to disclose; and their deceptive acts were not
communicated to the public.
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misrepresentation cases who fail to qualify for Basic's presumption of
reliance do not automatically find themselves claimless; they might still
have viable claims if they can prove actual reliance without the benefit
of the presumption. Liability for claims brought by these two categories
of 10b-5 plaintiffs more closely resembles liability for common-law
deceit than for fraud-on-the-market claims. Finally, even before Basic,
the Court recognized in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States a
presumption of reliance in the context of failure-to-disclose claims.88
In this Part, we consider the nature of the presumption in the
Basic line of cases and what it tells us about fraud-on-the-market
claims. We do so by way of a more general discussion of presumptions
in tort law. Although presumptions appear throughout the law, the
topic of presumptions has traditionally fallen within the purview of
evidence scholars.8 9 And yet, as with other general topics like damages,
causation, and reasonableness, tort law illuminates particularly well
the topic of presumptions. In the thirty-five years since Basic was
decided, fraud-on-the-market claims have become a cornerstone of
federal securities fraud litigation, in no small part because the
secondary market for publicly traded companies is enormous and fraudon-the-market claims are available to secondary market buyers and
sellers.9o

A. Compliance-EnhancingPresumptions,Substance-Morphing
Presumptions, and Mixed Presumptions
It goes without saying that presumptions are typically
motivated, at least in part, by policy rationales even though they
present themselves as facially neutral evidentiary rules.91 And, of
88. See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54 (explaining that a plaintiff need not prove reliance
to recover in a failure-to-disclose claim so long as the facts withheld are "material in the sense that
a reasonable investor might have considered them important"). We leave open the question of
whether failure-to-disclose claims are their own kind of 10b-5 claim or instead are best viewed as
a special subset of the kind of 10b-5 claims that, like those in Stoneridge, resemble deceit claims.
89. A valuable analytical overview of presumptions is provided by the "Presumptions"
chapter in MICHAEL M. MARTIN ET AL., NEW YORK EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 57-104 (2d ed. 2003). The
purpose-based distinctions drawn in our Article run perpendicular to several of the helpful
distinctions set forth in that chapter, including distinctions between evidentiary and burden
presumptions, permissive and mandatory presumptions, and rebuttable and irrebuttable
presumptions.

90.

Cf. Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, Forward-Casting10b-5 Damages:A Comparisonto Other

Methods, 37 J. CORP. L. 365, 366 (2012) (noting the importance of lob-5 litigation and the vastness
of possible liability exposure given the size of secondary markets).
91. Cf. Edmund M. Morgan, Some Observations ConcerningPresumptions,44 HARV. L. REV.
906, 906 (1931) (noting that a presumption may be supported "on logical grounds[,] because it
accomplishes a procedural convenience, . . . because it furthers a result deemed to be socially
desirable," or because of some combination of these three justifications).
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course, there is not just one policy at work. Our aim is to distinguish
among different kinds of policies that lie behind the presumptions in
tort law. The types of policies laid out below are broad; they likely
include subcategories.
The most common presumptions in tort law aim to provide a
more faithful application of the relevant legal rules to certain recurring
fact patterns. 92 We will call these "compliance-enhancing" doctrines.
The idea is that the normal rules of evidence, including the normal
allocation of standards of proof, while reasonably well designed to
effectuate the substantive rules of law, tend to perform poorly in certain
pockets of case law. These pockets feature certain recurring attributes
that cause the normal evidentiary and procedural rules to distort
outcomes; for example, there is a consistent asymmetry in the ability of
plaintiffs and defendants to access evidence. In response, courts
sometimes craft special evidentiary rules as correctives. These
presumptions are compliance enhancing because their aim is to
enhance the capacity of our system of adjudication to deliver results
consistent with the substantive laws being applied. 93
Res ipsa loquitur is probably the most famous tort doctrine
utilizing presumptions, and it is a compliance-enhancing doctrine.
Without res ipsa, a certain category of cases would too frequently be
subject to a successful defense motion for judgment as a matter of law.
By enabling claims in this category to go to verdict even in the absence
of evidence as to how exactly the defendant was careless, the doctrine
promises a distribution of wins and losses that better reflects
substantive negligence law. The rebuttable presumption of fault that
res ipsa creates is designed to produce wins for plaintiffs where there
92.

See generally JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE

COMMON LAW 313-52 (1898) (describing the process by which courts, when faced with recurring
facts, "cut short" the process of reasoning by "affix[ing], by a general declaration, the character and
operation which common experience has assigned to them").
93. For present purposes, we utilize a broad conception of what can count as a complianceenhancing presumption: one that aims to include what might otherwise be deemed a distinct
category of presumptions that serve the goal of administrative ease or efficiency. Consider the
presumption that a person who drives a car owner's vehicle was authorized to drive it. A court
might adopt this presumption in part to save litigants and judges time and expense in resolving
automobile-collision litigation. Such a presumption can nonetheless be recast as compliance
enhancing in the following sense: given that our system is prepared to devote only so much time
to litigation over the authorization issue, and given the role that stale testimony and implicit
understandings are likely to play in resolving that issue, one can expect a more accurate
distribution of results if the presumption is given to the plaintiff than if the plaintiff is required to
establish authorization. More generally, the selection of a presumption for compliance-enhancing
reasons is always made against a backdrop of understandings about the allocation of resources in
our adjudicative system, broadly speaking. We leave to another occasion the question of whether
it is untenably reductive to say, as a general matter, that presumptions motivated primarily by
administrative ease should be subsumed into the compliance-enhancing category.
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was careless conduct causing injury and wins for defendants where
there was not.
The classic res ipsa case is Byrne v. Boadle.94 There, a barrel fell
out of a window onto the plaintiff standing below on a public street. The
plaintiff brought a negligence claim against the owner of the barrel, who
also owned the business occupying the premises from which the barrel
fell. The defendant moved for dismissal because the plaintiff was unable
to produce any evidence of careless conduct by the defendant. The court
rejected this argument, reasoning that a jury could infer carelessness
from the fact that barrels ordinarily do not fall out of windows absent
someone's carelessness, that the defendant was in exclusive control of
the barrel, and that there was nothing pointing to carelessness by the
plaintiff. 95 Under these circumstances, the falling barrel-the thing
itself-bespoke fault on the part of the defendant.
The court in Byrne was not eliminating careless conduct as a
condition of negligence liability. It was, for a certain kind of case,
eliminating the need for the plaintiff to provide specific evidence of
carelessness. The substantive rule is the same: no liability for an injury
unless the defendant acted carelessly in causing the injury. The
problem is that in certain kinds of cases the ordinary requirement is
apt to lead to false negatives. The trick, then, is to fashion a rule that
converts the false negatives to true positives without also converting
true negatives to false positives.
Res ipsa is perhaps an atypical legal presumption because it
creates a rebuttable permissive inference, rather than a rebuttable
mandatory inference. But there are presumptions in torts that fall into
the rebuttable mandatory category. An example is the presumption,
upon proof that a defendant in an automobile-accident case owned the
vehicle in question, that the driver of the vehicle at the time of the
accident was operating the automobile with the owner's permission. 96
Like res ipsa, this presumption is a compliance-enhancing rule.
A different kind of aim that sometimes leads courts to recognize
a presumption in tort law is a desire to change the substantive legal
rules that apply to a category of cases. Here, the thought is that altering
the burden of proof on an element or defense can be an elegant and
effective way to implement a substantive change in the law. We will call
these kinds of presumptions "substance morphing." Note that we will

94. See 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (Exch. 1863) ("There are certain cases of which
it may be said res ipsa loquitur, . . . that the mere fact of the accident having occurred is evidence
of negligence . . .
95. Id.
96. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 89, at 79.
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sometimes call a presumption "substance morphing" even where more
straightforwardly evidentiary issues are also part of the reason for its
adoption. (For example, the presumption that a person is aware that
his sexual partner is below the age of consent is clearly substance
morphing even if it is also driven by access-to-evidence problems.)
The so-called tender years doctrine provides a nice example of a
substance-morphing presumption.97 In many jurisdictions, a child
below a certain age (for example, six years old) is conclusively presumed
not to have been careless in injuring the plaintiff or in failing to protect
herself from injury. This presumption, based on the mere fact of age, is
justified for two reasons. First, it is a reasonable generalization with
respect to children under a certain age. Second, our system rejects tort
liability for unintentional injuries caused by young children, as well as
the denial or reduction in a young child's tort damages, because of the
child's careless contribution to her own injury. By contrast, nothing
about the tender years doctrine is really about evidence: there seems
little reason to worry that juries will frequently treat a five-year-old's
conduct as careless when it is not.
By adopting this rule of substantive law through a presumption
of noncarelessness, courts shape liability in cases brought by and
against very young children in a manner that creates lawyerly comfort
with the idea of a bright-line age limit and that integrates these cases
into a spectrum that includes cases in which older children are given
certain accommodations yet nonetheless held responsible for their
actions. Moreover, courts do so without inviting a range of all-thingsconsidered judgments about whether it is really fair to hold very young
children responsible for injuries they cause or suffer, even if they did
act carelessly. And while substantive lawmaking through presumption
is perhaps less transparent than other modes of lawmaking, there may
well be good reasons to effect some substantive changes in this way, and
there is certainly a long history in law of doing so.98
97. See, e.g., Chi. City Ry. Co. v. Tuohy, 63 N.E. 997, 1002 (Ill. 1902) (holding that negligence
could not be imputed to a six-year-old child who, as a matter of law, was "incapable of exercising
care for his own safety").
98. The so-called presumption of damages in the common law of libel is another example of a
substance-morphing presumption. The basic idea is that if a defamatory statement is published
and heard, then unless it is not conceivable that it will be believed or entertained, reputational
injury necessarily follows. It is a presumption of damages only relative to a rule that includes
damages as an element.
It may be tempting to suppose that a compliance-enhancing presumption such as res ipsa
and a substance-morphing presumption such as the tender years doctrine are, in the end, the same
thing. Both in part aim to promote deterrence, compensation, or the doing of justice. It seems
foolish to deny that both presumptions are, in this sense, policy-driven, and we are not wedded to
any such denial. Rather, we are distinguishing between presumptions that operate in a manner
that essentially adds to or alters substantive legal rules and those that do not alter substantive
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Some presumptions do not fall cleanly in either of the categories
we have thus far identified and can be deemed "mixed."99 The Summers
v. Tice presumption concerning tortfeasor identification fits this
description.100 In Summers, two careless hunters each shot in the
direction of the plaintiff, but only one actually hit the plaintiff. No
evidence available to the plaintiff indicated that either of the hunters
was more likely to have been the one who caused the injury. The court
held that the two defendants were each subject to liability unless one
could prove that he was not the hunter who actually injured the
plaintiff.
By definition, Summers's notion of "alternative liability" arises
where there is substantial evidence as to each of two tort defendants,
but the evidence against each is, in effect, weakened because there is
equally strong evidence as to both. These situations generally foreclose
the ready availability of tie-breaking evidence. This means that the
application of the normal preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
virtually guarantees what the law regards as an unjust outcome-an
innocent victim of a completed tort will be left to bear the loss even
though the victim has identified the only two possible tortfeasors, and
we know that one of them actually committed the tort.
Alternative liability switches the burden so that the innocent
victim can recover from both defendants while preserving the
possibility that one defendant can avoid liability by demonstrating that
he probably did not cause the injury. In this way, the presumption
reduces the likelihood of an unwarranted dismissal under the
substantive law while, as to each defendant, increasing the chances of
imposing liability. In these respects, alternative liability is arguably
compliance enhancing. It is also compliance enhancing because of the
incentives it produces to those who are likely to have superior access to
legal rules, but instead alter evidentiary rules in order to achieve better compliance with extant
substantive legal rules.
99. Another tort doctrine, negligence per se, is perhaps sufficiently distinct to merit its own
category. When it applies, a litigant aiming to establish that another party acted carelessly need
not prove to a factfinder's satisfaction that the other party failed to use ordinary care. It is
sufficient to prove that the other party violated a particular statute or regulation. A standard
rationale for this rule resides in the relationship of courts to legislatures (and to agencies created
by legislatures): where another political institution is competent to articulate a legally binding
standard of conduct in the context of defining appropriate levels of precaution and has done so in
a manner that reaches the acts in question, courts should apply that standard of conduct rather
than the factfinder's in determining the content of the duty of care. See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 126
N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) ("[Tihe omission of a safeguard prescribed by statute is put upon a
different plane, and is held not merely some evidence of negligence, but negligence in itself.").
100. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948) (holding that, where two defendants were
identically careless toward the plaintiff, but only one actually harmed the plaintiff, the burden to
disprove causation of harm shifts to each defendant).
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evidence (the defendants). However, Summers further appears to put
in place a substantive rule that differs from the default substantive
rule. Absent disproof of causation, a careless actor who did not commit
the tort of negligence against the plaintiff will share liability for an
injury inflicted by another actor who did commit the tort. This
substantive rule is warranted, the Summers court believed, in light of
the two defendants' identically faulty behavior and the precisely equal
probability that each was the actual tortfeasor. In this situation, the
faulty actors were deemed more deserving of bearing the loss than the
victim.
Summers raises the possibility that some compliance-enhancing
presumptions are, from another perspective, substance morphing. Part
of what the substance of the law does, one might argue, is to designate
who ought to win a decisively important factual issue when evidentiary
inadequacy renders the issue irresolvable. This perspective is quite
attractive to the extent that burden-shifting presumptions are more
concerned with shifting the victor when the case is in equipoise than
with generating higher-quality applications of the substantive law.
Perhaps the closest match in the common law of torts to the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine is the so-called "heeding presumption"
that is sometimes adopted for failure-to-warn products liability
claims. 101 These claims assert that a product was unreasonably
dangerous because it lacked adequate warnings of certain risks.
Standard rules placing the burdens of production and persuasion on the
plaintiff would thus require a failure-to-warn plaintiff to prove that she
probably would not have been injured had a proper warning been
provided. In other words, she would have to argue that the warning
would have induced her not to use the product or to use it in a safer
manner. Yet many courts have adopted a presumption that had an
adequate warning been provided, the plaintiff would have read it and

101. See, e.g., Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 628 A.2d 724, 728-29 (N.J. 1993) (applying the
heeding presumption to "ease an injured plaintiffs burden of proof" and to avoid speculation about
whether the plaintiff would in fact have heeded a hypothetical warning). Arguably, in Affiliated
Ute, the Supreme Court adopted a comparable presumption for 10b-5 claims alleging that the
defendant's misrepresentation consisted of a failure to disclose information that the defendant was
required to disclose. See Affliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972)
(holding that "positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery"). In such cases, a
rebuttable presumption of reliance is created that, unlike Basic's presumption, can, in principle,
genuinely be rebutted by evidence that the plaintiff would not have behaved differently had
disclosure been made.
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heeded it. This is the heeding presumption. It is accepted in a large
number of jurisdictions, if not quite at the level of a majority rule. 102
Strikingly, the heeding presumption is rebuttable. If the
defendant is able to prove that the plaintiff probably would not have
read the warning even if had it been there (or would not have heeded it
even if she read it), then the defendant prevails. And the ability to rebut
the heeding presumption is not merely notional. Defense lawyers
frequently elicit in deposition testimony that the plaintiff did not read
the label or the instructions that were on the product, disposed of
accompanying documentation containing the relevant warnings
without reading it, was not literate in the language(s) of the warnings,
was in the habit of ignoring warnings, or did in fact read the warnings
but did not heed them. 103 Moreover, in pharmaceutical cases in which
the learned-intermediary rule applies, physicians sometimes testify
that they already knew what was in the omitted warning and, hence,
that the warning would not have changed their decision to prescribe the
defendant's medication to the plaintiff. 104 It may well be that the
heeding presumption ends up enhancing compliance with products
liability law by generating more evidence on the issue of heeding than
would otherwise have existed. Realistically, though, it also alters the
rule on equipoise, in part so that the failure-to-warn branch of products
liability law does not become utterly toothless.
B. Basic's Mixed Presumptionof Reliance
Armed with our tripartite taxonomy of presumptions, we can
now consider the proper categorization of Basic's presumption of
reliance.
At least superficially, Basic appears to articulate a complianceenhancing doctrine. The problem was not so much that plaintiffs could
not, in theory, prove reliance, but that the difficulty of doing so was
substantial given the nature and fact intensiveness of the question. And
the difficulty multiplied by hundreds or thousands of class members
102. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 11.4, at 760-61 (2005) (noting that
"almost half the states" have adopted the heeding presumption to help plaintiffs prove causation
for certain types of claims).
103. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Bestop, Inc., 713 A.2d 1079, 1089-92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
aff'd, 730 A.2d 285 (N.J. 1999) (discussing principles governing the admissibility of evidence put
forward to rebut the heeding presumption and affirming the jury's finding against plaintiff on
proximate cause).
104. See, e.g., Ingram v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 888 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1245-48 (W.D. Okla.
2012) (granting summary judgment to a pharmaceutical company, notwithstanding the heeding
presumption, in light of a treating physician's testimony that he would not have changed
treatment if a different warning had been given).
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would be enormous-so enormous that securities fraud class actions
would be impracticable. By comparison, a class action that finessed the
reliance issue by invoking fraud on the market would be manageable.
If one believes that the legal framework that Congress put in place to
deal with securities fraud was meant to grant persons a legal right not
to be defrauded on the stock market (and therefore, implicitly, a legal
right to recoup losses from having been defrauded), then one would
probably think that a systematic inability to recover is a failure of the
legal system to implement the governing law.
By the same token, one might reasonably suppose that in
securities fraud class actions, the presumption of reliance tends to
convert unwarranted defendant wins into rightful plaintiff wins more
often than it does the opposite. In short, the need for a refurbished
approach to proof of reliance stems from the need to have class actions,
a procedural device that, in turn, is required to implement substantive
law. The fraud-on-the-market doctrine, put differently, is needed
because a requirement of proof of individual reliance would largely
defeat the possibility of class certification, a result that would
significantly hamper this form of securities fraud regulation. Of course,
as with res ipsa loquitur, fraud on the market does not count as
compliance enhancing unless the presumption will in practice produce
results that track the underlying substantive law well enough to
counterbalance the distorting effects of the presumption. Hence, the
Court has insisted on the class action prerequisites of publicity,
efficiency, and materiality, which limit the classes of cases in which
fraud on the market can be invoked.
There is thus some basis for supposing that fraud on the market
is a compliance-enhancing presumption. Nonetheless, we suggest that
the far better view is that it should be understood as substance
morphing or mixed, and in any event not purely (or even principally)
compliance enhancing. The simplest way to demonstrate that the fraudon-the-market doctrine is not purely compliance enhancing (relative to
a rule requiring individual reliance) is to point out that there is no need
for the fact finder to find that the plaintiff herself actually read or heard
about the defendant's alleged misrepresentations or knew that they
were made. The typical rebuttals of fraud on the market-truth on the
market, for example-go to the issue of whether the misrepresentation
actually altered the price of the shares. But even if the
misrepresentations did affect the price, it does not follow that a plaintiff
relied on the content of the defendant's misrepresentationin any way.
What would follow instead is that the plaintiff suffered a financial
impact caused by the misrepresentation-a different matter altogether.
Defendants who rebut the reliance presumption with individualized
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proof do so by showing that the plaintiff did not view the market price
as a true reflection of the value of the shares. If the plaintiff did not
come into direct contact with the misrepresentations or with verbal
reiterations of them, then the plaintiff did not rely upon them, but this
fact, even if accepted by the fact finder, does not undermine a fraud-onthe-market claim. Relying upon the truth of what the defendants
represented and trusting in the nondistortednessof the market price are
entirely different. And yet, the plaintiff may recover on the basis of the
latter. Here, there is a clear distinction between the Basic presumption
of reliance and the heeding presumption in failure-to-warn cases. The
fraud-on-the-market theory does not preserve relianceon the substance
of the defendant's misrepresentationsas a genuine element of the legal
wrong of securities fraud.
The suggestion that Basic's presumption is substance morphing
raises two questions: (1) In what sense does the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine generate different substantive rules? (2) If it does generate
different substantive rules, why is the presumption rebuttable, rather
than irrebuttable? The short answer is that fraud on the market
accomplishes two things. It both changes the substantive rules and
affords presumptions in order to ensure better compliance with the
now-changed substantive rules. We can explain these features of fraudon-the-market doctrine as follows.
Substantive rules. Fraud on the market significantly alters the
substance of the elements of a private right of action relative to what
they would have been without the doctrine and what they are in the
common law of deceit. Without Basic, securities law would contain the
following rule, which we will call "Rule 1":
Rule 1. A private 10b-5 claim for securities fraud exists only when:
the plaintiff bought or sold a security relying upon the truth of the propositions that
the defendant knowingly and falsely asserted.

Instead, Basic adopts a different Rule-"Rule 2":
Rule 2. A private 10b-5 claim for securities fraud exists not only when Rule 1 is satisfied,
but also when:
(a) the defendant's misrepresentation (or illegal conduct under 10b-5) has distorted
the market price of the security, and
(b) a private plaintiff bought or sold the security at the distorted market price while
justifiably relying on the market price's being undistorted.
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Evidentiary rules. Given the usual allocation of evidentiary
burdens in civil litigation, Rule 1 would normally lead to the following
corollary rule of evidence, which we will label "El":
El. A plaintiff asserting a private 10b-5 claim must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that in buying or selling a security, she justifiably relied upon the truth of the
defendant's misrepresentations.

Similarly, Rule 2 would normally generate the following evidentiary
corollary:
E2. A plaintiff asserting a 10b-5 claim who does not seek to impose liability under Rule 1
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(a) the defendant's misrepresentation distorted the market price of the security, and
(b) the plaintiff bought or sold the security while justifiably relying on the market
price being nondistorted.

In fact, Basic does not adopt corollary E2. Rather, it adopts a different
corollary:
E3. A plaintiff asserting a 10b-5 claim who does not seek to impose liability under Rule 1
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(a) the defendant's misrepresentation was publicly made, the market was efficient,
and the statement was material, and
(b) the plaintiff bought or sold the security.

In justifying the choice of corollary E3(a), rather than corollary
E2(a), the Basic Court reasoned that publicity, efficiency, and
presumption that the
materiality
generate a rebuttable
misrepresentation distorted the price of the security. In justifying the
choice of corollary E3(b) rather than corollary E2(b), the Court also
stated that investors presumptively rely on the integrity of the market
and therefore presumptively rely on open-market transactions not
being distorted. The Court then allowed defendants to rebut this
presumption of reliance on nondistortedness.
As noted above, the fact that the reliance presumption is
rebuttable might seem to demonstrate that Basic's presumption must
be of the compliance-enhancing variety. And indeed, there is an aspect
of the presumption that is compliance enhancing. What is compliance
enhancing, however, is the choice to implement Rule 2 by corollary E3
rather than by corollary E2. And what is truly remarkable about Basic
is that instead of choosing corollary El to implement Rule 1, the Court
replaced Rule 1 with Rule 2 and then chose corollary E3 as a means of
implementing Rule 2. Basic is confusing because the Court sometimes
seems to suggest that corollary E3 can be understood as a means of
implementing Rule 1, which it is not. Corollary E3 is compliance
enhancing, but it is only compliance enhancing given the replacement
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of substantive Rule 1 with substantive Rule 2. This is why Basic is both
substance morphing and compliance enhancing.
The wrong identified by Basic remains similar to common-law
deceit in several respects. It is like deceit because it deems a knowing
misrepresentation (or manipulative conduct) to be a predicate wrongful
act and requires the plaintiffs injury to have been brought about by this
wrongful act. Moreover, an active choice by the plaintiff is an essential
component of the chain of events culminating in the plaintiff being
damaged. And indeed, if the plaintiff made that choice without trust in
the integrity of the transaction, then the plaintiff cannot recover.
Still, the causal pathway in a deceit case is fundamentally
different from that in a fraud-on-the-market case. In deceit, the plaintiff
relies on the misrepresentation or its reiteration. The wrong is complete
when the plaintiff enters a transaction in reliance on a
misrepresentation that the defendant made to induce such reliance. In
a fraud-on-the-market case, by contrast, the wrong is completed only
when the potential loss of value due to the misrepresentation (an
exchange made at a distorted price) is realized in an actual loss of
wealth suffered by the plaintiff.
The foregoing analysis allows us to identify and elucidate
otherwise troubling aspects of Justice Blackmun's Basic opinion. A
major slide in his analysis is contained in the statement that "[b]ecause
most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an
investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations,
therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action."10 5 The
term "reflected" in this passage is ambiguous. The passage is defensible
insofar as he is claiming that prices are influenced by publicly available
information and in fact distorted by misinformation. However, it is also
possible to understand the statement to be asserting that prices express
the meaning, or at least the significance, of the misrepresentationsthat prices are a virtual translation of the defendant's
misrepresentations. On the latter view, it is as if the
misrepresentations were about the company's magnitude of debt and
the prices were bond ratings. Price would be a "reflection" of the
misrepresentation in the particular sense of being a winnowed-down
and transformed reiteration of it.
Unfortunately, the "translation" version of Justice Blackmun's
claim that prices will (under the right conditions) "reflect" a defendant's
misrepresentations is wholly untenable. As commentators have long
noted, investors do not necessarily rely on market prices to be accurate
valuations; indeed, they often make stock purchases precisely because
105. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (emphasis added).
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they believe a stock is incorrectly valued. 106 A price is not an assertion
or a representation. To be sure, if Basic only stands for the softer
proposition that misrepresentations influence prices, its reasoning is
quite a bit more plausible, especially in efficient markets. However, on
this understanding of what it means for prices to "reflect" the
defendant's misrepresentation, the plaintiff can never be said to have
relied on that representation. If one takes this view, then one must see
the fraud-on-the-market presumption as something other than an
application of common-law deceit. In other words, permitting fraud-onthe-market plaintiffs to recover is not simply a way of allowing more
deceit plaintiffs to win by diminishing their burden of proof, as a purely
compliance-enhancing presumption would do.
None of this is to say that Justice Blackmun was unjustified in
embracing the fraud-on-the-market theory or that he was wrong to craft
the law in a manner that involved a presumption. There is no
fundamental reason why the Court should have assumed that it was
limited to versions of common-law fraud. After all, the legal authorities
in question were section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Hence, the key question
was whether the injured parties in fraud-on-the-market claims could be
understood to be among those whom Congress intended to protect from
certain harms caused by misrepresentations. "Yes" is a reasonable
answer to this question. When actors in the securities market engage
in misrepresentations and other misleading conduct, those who have
bought and sold securities at distorted prices are among their most
direct victims. And certainly such investors are exactly the people the
Securities Act was aimed to protect.
One advantage of our analysis of the nature of Basic's
presumption is that it can help make sense of a tension between two
aspects of Basic that have been a source of puzzlement. The first is its
statement that "[a]n investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by
the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price."107 The
second is its statement that an investor who demonstrably did not rely
upon the integrity of the price should not be able to recover, even if the
price was in fact distorted.108 Even before the Court issued Basic, the
relation between these two claims caused confusion. Indeed, as the
Court's internal correspondence indicates, Justice Brennan thought
that Justice Blackmun was making a mistake by allowing a fraud-on-

106. Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance
Requirements in CertainOpen Market Transactions,62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 455 (1984) (cited in Basic,
485 U.S. at 247 n.26).

107. Basic, 428 U.S. at 247.
108. Id. at 249.
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the market defendant to avoid liability by proving that the plaintiff was
not relying on the integrity of the market in deciding to purchase or sell
a security.109 Brennan thought that Blackmun's allowance of rebuttal
on this ground amounted to backsliding on what Brennan understood
to be Basic's commitment to impose liability for fraud on the market on
a fundamentally different basis from liability for deceit.
Brennan's concern was understandable, in part because Justice
Blackmun was not always clear as to why he was keen to give
defendants the opportunity to prove lack of plaintiff reliance on market
integrity. But in the end, the two propositions need not be in tension.
The key is to understand that the second proposition is really concerned
with a very special case of nonreliance-namely, a case in which the
plaintiff undertakes the relevant transaction with his eyes wide open to
the presence of a distorted price or the risk of such distortion. Justice
Blackmun, in other words, was concerned with a future case in which
the defendant could plausibly assert something akin to consent,
assumption of risk, or volenti non fit injuria"o-a familiar set of
defenses found throughout tort law. Roughly speaking, the idea
common to each is that if one is aware of the harmfulness or riskiness
of another's wrongful conduct but freely chooses to confront it anyway,
one may not afterwards complain about resulting injuries.
Notably, the common law of fraud does not recognize any of these
affirmative defenses by name. But it does not do so for a very particular
reason: a version of these defenses is already built into the prima facie
case through the requirement that the plaintiffs reliance on the
defendant's misrepresentation be justified or reasonable. However,
with the switch in Basic to a price-distortion, economic-loss tort, there
was no longer a place within the prima facie case to account for how the
plaintiffs knowing choices contributed to her injury. And yet, there
remained for Justice Blackmun the powerful intuition, given expression
in various tort doctrines, that at least some victims who knowingly
choose to encounter certain risks of harm and then experience those
harms should not be empowered to recover damages, even from a
wrongdoer who caused those harms.
The correspondence between the Justices reveals that it took
Justice Blackmun some time to connect the volenti issue to the issue of
rebutting Basic's presumption of reliance.11 His first instinct seems to
109. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Jan. 15, 1988)
(on file with Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Collection, No. 86-279).
110. The Latin maxim can be paraphrased to state: "No wrong is done (non fit injuria)to a
person who is willing (volenti)."
111. Correspondence between Justice Harry A. Blackmun and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
(Jan. 1988) (on file with Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Collection, No. 86-279).
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have been that an investor who really does not care about whether a
defendant's representations were true or false should not be able to
recover for securities fraud, however defined. In correspondence with
Justice Brennan, he gave expression to this instinct through the
"principled investor" problem: the example of an investor who sells his
shares in a company upon learning that the company has investments
in apartheid South Africa, irrespective of the profits or losses he stood
to make from the sale. In Blackmun's view, this investor should not
recover, even assuming that the company's misrepresentation had
distorted the sales price. To permit recovery, he maintained, would
grant the investor a "windfall."'1 2 Justice Brennan resisted this
example because, as he pointed out, such an investor could still have
suffered economic loss based on the price distortion caused by the
defendant's misrepresentation. 113
The Justices did not resolve the issue in their correspondence.114
However, by the time Justice Blackman produced his final opinion in
Basic,115 he had solved the principled investor problem to his
satisfaction:
Petitioners also could rebut the presumption of reliance as to plaintiffs who would have
divested themselves of their Basic shares without relying on the integrity of the market.
For example, a plaintiff who believed that Basic's statements were false and that Basic
was indeed engaged in merger discussions, and who consequently believed that Basic
stock was artificially underpriced, but sold his shares nevertheless because other
unrelated concerns, e.g., potential antitrust problems, or political pressures to divest from
shares of certain businesses, could not be said to have relied on the integrity of a price he

knew had been manipulated. 16

In this example, it is no longer simply that the plaintiff did not care that
he was trading at a nonmanipulated price. Rather, the opinion posits a
case in which the plaintiff has knowingly and voluntarily sold shares at
less than they are worth. Surely this sort of plaintiff, the opinion
reasons, is not entitled to invoke the judicial system to recover for his
losses. This is the sort of "windfall"" 7 that concerned Blackmun-the
recovery of damages by a plaintiff who chooses to buy or sell

112. Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justice Brennan, supra note 109.
113. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Jan. 22, 1988)
(on file with Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Collection, No. 86-279).
114. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Jan. 27, 1988)
(on file with the Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Collection, No. 86-279).
115. It appears that this was a version of the analysis he contemplated in his second letter to
Justice Brennan. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Jan.
25, 1988) (on file with the Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Collection, No. 86-279).
116. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 (1988) (emphasis added).
117. Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justice Brennan, supra note 109.
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notwithstanding the fact that he actually disbelieves the defendant's
misrepresentations.
To rephrase the point in the language of presumptions, the
principled investor problem arises mainly because the common law of
deceit normally provides defendants with a presumption of volenti. It is
the job of deceit plaintiffs to rebut this presumption by proving that
their reliance on a defendant's misrepresentation was justified. In
moving from the wrong of deceit to the wrong of fraud on the market,
the Court in Basic effectively removed this presumption, leaving
defendants with no legal space in which to make a volenti argument.
Justice Blackmun's insistence that the presumption of reliance is
rebuttable was an effort to create that space. Rather than building it
into the prima facie case, he followed the more typical pattern in tort
law by fashioning it as an affirmative defense.118

Because our analysis of Basic has several moving parts, a brief
summary is in order. Basic's treatment of fraud-on-the-market claims
departed in two respects from the common law of deceit, and each
departure contained complexities of its own. The first departure
concerned the nature of the injury underlying the tort. The second
concerned the role of the plaintiffs conduct in determining liability.
The introduction of a new notion of injury was the more
important innovation. It had both a substantive and an evidentiary
aspect. Basic claimed merely to be creating an evidentiary rule-a
presumption of reliance. Yet this presumption applies even if the
plaintiff was entirely unaware of the content of the defendant's
misrepresentations and hence could not have relied on that content.
The fact that Basic's presumption cannot be rebutted by a showing of
nonreliance demonstrates that, despite its claim to the contrary, the
118. A recent case from the Southern District of New York shows how a fraud-on-the-market
defendant might succeed in rebutting the presumption of reliance in an individual investor case
where distortion has been proven (and other differently situated investors who benefited from the
presumption prevailed). GAMCO Investors, Inc. v. Vivendi, S.A., No. 09 Civ. 7962(SAS), 2013 WL
765122, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013). In GAMCO, Judge Scheindlin held a bench trial to resolve
defendant Vivendi's assertion that subsidiaries of Gabelli Asset Management, Inc.-which relied
upon their own idiosyncratic market analyses in making investment decisions-had not relied on
the defendant's misrepresentations about corporate liquidity. Id. at *1. Judge Sheindlin
determined that the defendant had carried its burden of proving that "[p]laintiffs were value-based
investors who utilized a proprietary metric . .. to evaluate the intrinsic value of Vivendi securities
[and that] . . . the liquidity crisis at Vivendi was irrelevant to [p]laintiffs' investment decisions,
except to the extent that each corrective disclosure made Vivendi a more attractive investment."
Id. at *5 (emphasis added). Gamco nicely illustrates the sense in which a rebuttal of the reliance
presumption in a fraud-on-the-market case resembles a traditional volenti defense in tort.

1798

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:6:1755

Court did not merely shift the burden to the defendant on the issue of
reliance. Instead, it replaced the conception of injury at the core of
deceit-the injury of being tricked by a defendant's representation-with
something different. The relevant injury is now the injury of being
economically harmed by price distortions flowing from a defendant's
misrepresentations.
While Basic thus departed from deceit law in its definition of
what counts as an injury, its holding with respect to injury was not only
substantive. For with that substantive change, it also introduced a new
evidentiary rule. Specifically, it held that a plaintiff need not directly
prove that the defendant's misrepresentations distorted the price of the
securities that the plaintiff bought or sold. Rather, the price-distorting
effect of the misrepresentations will be presumed when the plaintiff
proves that the misrepresentations were material and were made in an
efficient market. This presumption is rebuttable-for example, by proof
that the market already had absorbed the relevant misinformation. But
it is not a rebuttable presumption of reliance. It is instead a rebuttable
presumption of distortion. Distortion is substituted for reliance
precisely because being economically harmed is the injury at the center
of the fraud-on-the-market tort, rather than the injury of being duped.
The evidentiary presumption of reliance goes hand in hand with Basic's
substantive redefinition of injury.
Basic's second alteration, concerning the significance of a
plaintiffs conduct, is less consequential but more nuanced. Deceit, like
negligence, battery, trespass, and virtually every tort, deems certain
contributions by a plaintiff to her own injury as undermining or limiting
her claim. These plaintiff-conduct limits on liability-which include
comparative fault, assumption of risk, waiver, and consent-are usually
framed as affirmative defenses.
In common-law deceit, plaintiffs who are tricked by a
defendant's knowing misrepresentation cannot recover if they
unjustifiably relied on the misrepresentation. This plaintiff-conduct
limit on liability is part of the prima facie case: it is the plaintiff who
must prove that her reliance was justifiable. In replacing reliance with
distortion, the Basic Court eliminated the doctrinal vehicle through
which the law of deceit allows a court to consider a plaintiffs
contribution to her own injury. Not wanting to abandon the notion that
a plaintiffs voluntary decision to confront a defendant's potentially
injurious conduct should count against the plaintiff, Justice Blackmun
enabled fraud-on-the-market defendants to avoid liability by proving
that the plaintiff was not relying in any way on the integrity of (i.e., the
undistorted nature of) the market price. In doing so, he departed from
the common law's casting of the principle of volenti non fit injuria as

2013]

THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET TORT

1799

part of a deceit plaintiffs prima facie case, instead placing it in its more
traditional role as an affirmative defense. Conveniently but
confusingly, Justice Blackmun folded this aspect of fraud-on-themarket law into the idea of the rebuttable presumption of reliance,
thereby further muddying the meaning of that presumption. This
distinct aspect of the presumption holds as follows: although purchasers
of publicly traded securities are presumed to rely on the integrity of the
market, that presumption can be rebutted when the plaintiff proceeds
with the transaction knowing of, yet indifferent to, the possibility of
price distortion.
In sum, under the unitary banner of the "presumption of
reliance," Basic first changed the definition of injury for fraud-on-themarket claims. In introducing that change, it also conferred on
plaintiffs the benefit of an evidentiary presumption of price distortion
if certain conditions are met. At the same time, it altered the way in
which securities fraud law-in a manner broadly consistent with
general tort principles-blocks recovery by a plaintiff who is injured
only after choosing to proceed in the face of the defendant's wrongful
conduct.
V. THE VIABILITY OF THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET TORT
A careful examination of the common law of deceit, and of Dura
and Basic, reveals that the Supreme Court has not stayed true to the
common law in the course of articulating the dimensions of liability for
the fraud-on-the-market version of securities fraud, despite its
protestations to the contrary. Rather, it has fashioned a new statutory
tort.
As we noted in Part I, some commentators suggest that fraudon-the-market claims have not merely left behind the law of deceit but
have left the realm of tort law altogether. The thought is that Basic's
nominally rebuttable but practically irrebuttable presumption of
reliance allows for liability without anything like the sort of setback
that tort law would ordinarily consider a cognizable injury. Investors
stand to recover merely for having participated in a stock market that
contained distorted prices. On this view, Dura's insistence on economic
loss is incoherent because it demands proof of tort-like damages for
claims that, at the end of the day, really are not tort claims. Instead,
they are best understood as actions by private attorneys general that
aim to protect and vindicate the integrity of markets rather than to
compensate victims for their losses.
It is correct to assert that fraud-on-the-market claims are not
claims for deceit. But it is erroneous to assert that the former no longer
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count as tort claims-in other words, relational, injurious, legal wrongs
that, when committed, confer on their victims a right to seek redress for
the wrongs done to them.119 The legal norm implicit in the common-law
tort of deceit directs actors to refrain from tricking others into taking
detrimental actions, and it simultaneously confers a legal power upon
whomever is so tricked and suffers damage as a result to obtain redress
from the fraudster. The right to sue on a fraud-on-the-market theory,
by contrast, does not derive from a common-law legal norm enjoining
persons from tricking each other. It derives from a statute (and
regulations) forbidding actors from making misrepresentations and
misleading statements about securities-a statute put in place to make
markets safer for investors. Accordingly, the legal power provided
through decisions such as Basic and Dura does not require the plaintiff
to have been tricked by the misrepresentation; it affords an avenue of
redress to investors who suffer an economic hit in the securities
markets because of a market distortion caused by a knowing
misrepresentation. Reliance by the victim on the substance of the
actor's misrepresentation is not required, but proof of economic loss and
loss causation is. In these ways, life is both easier and harder for the
fraud-on-the-market plaintiff than a deceit plaintiff.
In sum, the fraud-on-the-market tort defines injury and
connects misrepresentation to injury in a manner distinct from the tort
of deceit. But as we noted in our earlier article on fraud and reliance,
the recognition of distinct wrongs involving misrepresentation is hardly
unknown to common law.120 Intentional misrepresentations sometimes
give rise to torts other than deceit. For example, when an actor's
intentional misrepresentation to person X foreseeably causes physical
injury to person Y, Y may have a negligence claim against that actor.12 1
The actor's defrauding of X in this instance happens also to amount to
the careless injuring of Y Intentional misrepresentations not relied
upon by the plaintiff also can sometimes give rise to claims for tortious
interference with contract or prospective advantage.122 Here, the gist of
the plaintiffs complaint is not that the defendant duped her, but rather
that the defendant's duping of another amounted to an intentional
119. See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S.
LAW: TORTS 4 (2010).
120. Goldberg, Sebok & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1021-25.
121. See, e.g., Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 591 (Cal. 1997)
(holding that the writer of a letter of recommendation owes third persons a duty not to make
misrepresentations that cause a substantial, foreseeable risk of physical harm to such persons).
122. See, e.g., Duggin v. Adams, 360 S.E.2d 832, 837 (Va. 1987) (finding that allegations that
defendant maliciously and fraudulently mislead seller to breach contract of sale with plaintiff were
sufficient to plead a claim of tortious interference through improper means).
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interference, through wrongful means, with the plaintiffs contract or
business prospects.
The Supreme Court's fraud-on-the-market cause of action, on
the other hand, imposes liability on terms that go beyond these
common-law wrongs. The negligence example described immediately
above would provide recourse for a traditional personal injury but not
for economic loss. To be sure, negligence that causes only economic loss
can sometimes give rise to liability. However, courts usually require a
special relationship between the defendant and plaintiff before they will
impose liability for such loss. And the limited class of cases in which
courts recognize negligence claims for economic loss in the absence of a
special relationship tends to involve allegations that the defendant's
carelessness caused a nuisance-like interference with the plaintiffs
right to use, or pursue the acquisition of, certain tangible property, as
opposed to causing a mere reduction in wealth. 123
More to the point, courts' recognition of' fraud-on-the-market
claims seems roughly consistent with their recognition of claims in
which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's defrauding of a third
party amounted to interference by wrongful means with a business
opportunity enjoyed by the plaintiff. Tortious interference actions of
this sort and fraud-on-the-market actions arguably vindicate the same
interest: pursuing business transactions free from the marketdistorting effects of intentional misrepresentations.1 24 For the most
part, these common-law claims are more tightly circumscribed than
fraud on the market. A tortious-interference plaintiff typically
complains that she was wrongfully prevented from taking advantage of
a particular transaction or opportunity, not that she merely lost wealth.
In addition, the wrongful conduct in question usually involves the
defendant specifically targeting the plaintiff, rather than making a
misrepresentation meant to influence markets generally. In both
respects, fraud on the market invokes a looser, more open-ended notion
of what can count as the wrongful injuring of another.
Yet even if fraud on the market sits at the expansive edge of tort
law, it nonetheless occupies a legitimate place. As noted above, claims
for securities fraud have statutory backing, unlike common-law torts.
Obviously, the question of whether federal courts should be in the
business of recognizing implied rights of action is a controversial one,
123. See John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful
Interferencewith Inheritance,65 STAN. L. REV. 335, 386-88 (2013) (discussing tort cases protecting
"prospective advantage"); see also People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107,
118 (N.J. 1985) (allowing recovery for negligence causing "purely economic loss" that took the form
of temporarily rendering the plaintiff unable to use its commercial office space).
124. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 123, at 386-88.
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and it seems entirely possible that the Supreme Court today would not
choose to go down the road that the Court in the 1960s took when it
recognized private rights of action for violations of federal securities
laws. 125 Moreover, even if federal courts should be in this business,
there are difficult questions as to whether all the species of securities
fraud that would warrant an SEC enforcement action should also give
rise to a private right of action. 126 Still, unless the Court decides to undo
fifty years of 10b-5 jurisprudence-notwithstanding Congress's active
participationl 27-the question at hand is not whether there should be
private rights of action for securities fraud, but rather how we should
define them. In enacting the federal securities laws, Congress clearly
sought to vindicate the interests of individual investors and to
compensate for limitations in SEC enforcement.1 28 Against this
backdrop, it is reasonable for the Court to have identified as a tort the
intentional
causing
of economic
loss
through
material
misrepresentations in connection with the sale or purchase of
securities. In practice, moreover, both Congress and the courts have
developed fraud-on-the-market law with an eye toward circumscribing
the potential breadth of this tort. This, of course, was the whole point
of Dura. And, while the Justices have obviously disagreed among
themselves as to the proper procedures through which fraud-on-themarket claims are to be litigated, they have, to say the least, been
attentive to concerns that the new tort, when coupled with the class
action device, will make life too easy for plaintiffs and too difficult for
defendants.
This last thought leads us, finally, to consider whether our
particular characterization of the fraud-on-the-market tort has proplaintiff or pro-defendant implications. Our sense is that it has some of
each. We mentioned at the outset that some commentators have
criticized the Court's articulation of the elements of fraud-on-themarket claims as unmotivated or incoherent. Our own view is that
while a decision such as Dura cannot be defended simply as applying
settled deceit doctrine, its notions of economic loss and loss causation
are at least plausible features of a tort that compensates victims for
125. Compare Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-79 (1979) (declining to
recognize a private right of action for violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and questioning more generally the propriety of recognizing implied rights of action in federal
statutes), with JI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964) (recognizing an implied right of
action for violations of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
126. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-68 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.,
concurring).
127. Of course, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 and has
since amended it. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
128. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432.
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suffering economic loss as a result of intentional misrepresentations
that distort the market. It may be that Dura in the end adopted an
overly narrow view of what counts as economic loss, or an overly broad
view of when a loss is the result of independent forces apart from the
defendant's misrepresentation. But the Court was nonetheless
reasonable to require something more than purchase at an inflated
price and but-for causation to establish liability for the wrong of fraud
on the market.
If in this respect our approach is defendant friendly, it may be
less so in others. We noted at the outset that some of the Justices seem
inclined to abandon any version of fraud on the market. 129 For the
reasons canvassed above, their skepticism is in one sense
understandable: Basic's attempt to justify fraud on the market as a
mere compliance-enhancing presumption fails. But this warranted
skepticism is, in the end, skepticism about a particular understanding
of and justification for fraud on the market rather than about the idea
in general. Insofar as fraud on the market is the name for a distinct tort
that redresses intentional misrepresentations that proximately cause a
certain kind of economic loss, irrespective of whether the victim relied
on the substance of the misrepresentation, it is a viable-and probably
manageable-tort.
VI. CONCLUSION

Common-law deceit involves the manipulation of one person by
another. At its core, it forbids and renders actionable the intentional
use of a false representation to induce another to enter into a
transaction. If one intentionally makes a misrepresentation knowing
that a person such as the plaintiff will rely on it, and if the
misrepresentation justifiably induces the plaintiff to act, the tort has
been committed. As such, deceit is entirely applicable to a broad range
of impersonal transactions.
And yet not every transaction influenced by a misrepresentation
amounts to deceit. In particular, there is no deceit when a
misrepresentation negatively affects a losing transaction but the
plaintiff never actually relied on its substance. This kind of plaintiff
cannot complain of having been manipulated in the requisite sense.
In articulating the contours of securities fraud liability, the
Supreme Court sought in Basic to relax the reliance requirement,
thereby allowing certain 10b-5 actions to move forward as class actions.
129. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013) (Alito, J.,

concurring).
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It purported to do so by giving investors who trade in efficient markets
on the basis of material misrepresentations the benefit of a
presumption that relieves them of the burden of proving reliance. But
as we have explained, this presumption does not merely alter
evidentiary burdens; it alters substantive law. Basic in fact marked the
recognition of a new legal wrong-the fraud-on-the-market tort. In
contrast to deceit, this tort imposes liability on an actor who
intentionally makes a material misrepresentation that distorts market
prices and thereby inflicts economic loss on an investor. The gist of the
wrong is not the defrauding, manipulation, or tricking of another
person, per se. Rather, it consists of causing another to suffer economic
loss by circulating false information that distorts market prices.
Basic itself was careful to insist that this new tort has limits of
its own. In particular, defendants can avoid liability by establishing
that a given plaintiffs investment decision was made for reasons having
nothing to do with any price distortion generated by the defendant's
misrepresentations. Many Justices, including Justice White in Basic
itself, have taken the view that this stated limit is insufficient-that it
allows savvy investors falsely to claim to have been victimized when
they were merely taking a calculated risk that turned out badly.130 In
light of this concern-one magnified by the allegedly amplifying effects
of class action litigation-the Court has for some time now aimed to
tighten up fraud on the market. This tightening has been both
procedural and substantive, focusing on pleading and proof
requirements with respect to issues such as materiality, economic loss,
and loss causation.
As did Basic itself, subsequent decisions have understated the
degree to which these tightening efforts have been exercises in
lawmaking as opposed to straightforward applications of settled tort
doctrine. But to say that the Court has been engaged in lawmaking is
not to say that it has thereby acted illegitimately or in an unprincipled
fashion. In recognizing the fraud-on-the-market tort, and in continuing
to refine it, the Court has, in the context of interpreting a statutory and
regulatory scheme, mimicked the common-law tradition that allows
judges a certain amount of leeway to articulate new legal wrongs that
provide victims with a right of action against wrongdoers. Perhaps if
the Justices had been more forthcoming or self-aware about the degree
to which they have been engaged in this task, they would have defined
fraud on the market somewhat differently, with less concern about
whether its limits track the limits of common-law deceit and greater
130. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 262 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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clarity about its contours. Regardless, a clearer recognition of the
nature of the Court's undertaking should assuage any doubts as to its
legitimacy. Fraud on the market is neither a jury-rigged device for
enabling disappointed investors to prevail without proof of reliance nor
a securities-enforcement engine providing plaintiffs' lawyers with a
means of circumventing traditional class-certification requirements. It
is a tort in its own right.

